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1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 24 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. DHANAPALA	(Sri Lanka)
later:	Mr. WHEELER (Vice-President)	(South Africa)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ZAKI (Maldives) said that he wished to touch briefly upon the various aspects involved in the review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, namely, the objectives of the Treaty; what had been achieved; the obligations of States under the Treaty; the role played by the Treaty in arms control, disarmament and the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; and, above all, what remained to be done. His country, like the 177 other States parties, attached the utmost importance to the Treaty, since it was the only instrument which effectively supported non-proliferation and provided a foundation for global peace and security.

2. The Treaty was, however, not an end in itself. It contained provisions for periodic review and should in time lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world. In addition, it enshrined the right of countries to conduct peaceful nuclear programmes within a specific framework. The basic concept on which the Treaty was based was almost as old as the United Nations itself.

3. The characteristic features of the Treaty were that it played a considerable role with respect to the practical and legal implications of national and regional security; that it provided a clearly discernible programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through negotiations in good faith and the adoption of measures in that area; that it provided for peaceful national nuclear programmes under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); that it set out the principles governing the transfer of nuclear technology for the benefit of all parties; and that it supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world (two such zones were already in existence, and others were being considered).

4. The Treaty did not deal solely with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it also dealt with disarmament and international peace and security. The international community should therefore give the Treaty its full support if it wished, in the words of the Charter of the United Nations, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The Treaty was the foundation of the non-proliferation regime and was closely linked to IAEA safeguards. Since the Treaty was a major factor in preventing nuclear war and in arms control and limitation efforts, it was not surprising that the review and extension of the Treaty should arouse such interest and anxiety. It was, on the other hand, sad and disconcerting to note that suspicion and envy were also playing a role.

5. His delegation welcomed the reassuring statements made recently by the five nuclear Powers and the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995). The extension of the Treaty for a fixed period or series of fixed periods would ensure the continuation of the Treaty, but it would create uncertainty about the future. Criticism of the Treaty as discriminatory had been equally valid at the time of its adoption in 1968 and its entry into force in 1970. It was not so much the cold war but rather the possession by some States of a weapon of mass destruction which had prompted the adoption of the Treaty. It was therefore

imperative to extend the Treaty in order to guarantee a safe future for the world and his country supported an indefinite extension without conditions. It commended the peoples and Governments of South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine for having convincingly demonstrated to the international community their great confidence in the Treaty.

6. Mr. ABDULAI (Ghana) said that 50 years ago, the horrors of nuclear war had been demonstrated in Hiroshima and the international community had decided that the future of mankind would be better guaranteed "without the bomb". The fears of the international community had been reflected shortly thereafter in the establishment of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the precursor of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose mandate was to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons and promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under international control. In 1961, the General Assembly had called for measures to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States and, in 1968, it had adopted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

7. Having become a Member of the United Nations after attaining its independence in 1957, Ghana had taken part in the negotiations culminating in the adoption of the Treaty. In the 1960s, it had organized conferences on a "World without the Bomb" to protest against nuclear tests in the Sahara. It was therefore logical that it had been one of the first States to sign the Treaty in 1968 and to ratify it in 1970.

8. His delegation saw the non-proliferation regime not as an end in itself but rather as a means towards nuclear disarmament. The Treaty was intended to prevent the proliferation and wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament. The Treaty also sought to encourage international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and recognized the inalienable right of all States, in particular the developing countries, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis.

9. Under the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology to any recipient whatsoever, whether directly or indirectly. For their part, the non-nuclear-weapon States undertook not to receive or seek to develop nuclear weapons or technology for making such weapons and to submit their peaceful nuclear facilities and materials to IAEA safeguards. Safeguards were not to hamper economic or technological development of the parties. The Treaty was not perfect. Although it had succeeded in limiting the number of nuclear-weapon States, it had not had an impact on the number and quality of nuclear weapons and had not achieved its objectives with regard to disarmament. Such progress in disarmament as had been achieved had come about in the context of other treaties (START I and II).

10. Ghana welcomed the assistance it received from IAEA and friendly countries, which enabled it to apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the fields of health, agriculture and industry, but believed that much more could be achieved under the Treaty. His delegation also wished to draw attention to certain points of the non-proliferation Treaty which were a cause of concern for the non-aligned countries, including his own: States parties should reaffirm their

commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons according to a specific timetable; they should agree to a target date for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons; they should commit themselves to respect nuclear-weapon-free zones and reaffirm the inalienable rights of the parties to full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In addition, the nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to pursuing negotiations on legally binding negative and posi'ive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. His delegation believed that, with a sincere commitment by all the parties to the disarmament objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty, the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be concluded more quickly, and it hoped that such a treaty could be concluded in the next few months, with the cooperation of all parties concerned. His delegation appreciated the efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States which were permanent members of the Security Council to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances before the Conference, but hoped that the security assurances would be legally binding.

12. Following the abandonment by South Africa of its nuclear-weapons programme, the African continent was engaged in the preparation of a treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and his delegation hoped that the proposed instrument would receive the support of all. The international community should also vigorously pursue efforts to end tensions in the Middle East and South Asia so that nuclear-weapon-free zones could be established in those regions.

13. His country was prepared to participate in negotiations on the future of the Treaty and hoped that they would lead to a stronger non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament and would promote peace. The best solution for all States was truly a "world without the bomb".

14. Mr. BIRKAVS (Latvia) said that, as an occupied State in 1968, his country had been unable to participate in the conference at which the non-proliferation Treaty had been drafted. It paid tribute to the drafters of the Treaty and noted that, by relinquishing a part of their sovereignty, States parties had collectively reduced the risk of Armageddon. The end of the cold war, in halting the nuclear-arms race, had reduced that risk even further. Latvia supported indefinite, unconditional extension of the Treaty.

15. Twenty-five years after the adoption of the Treaty, one of the main purposes of which was to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States, horizontal proliferation among non-nuclear-weapon States could, on the whole, be seen to have been kept in check. However, his country was alarmed that some States were seeking or had sought a nuclear-weapons capacity. While there had been relative success in curbing horizontal proliferation, halting vertical proliferation had proved an elusive goal during the cold war. Latvia was gratified that the arms race had at long last been reversed and that the various disarmament agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, as well as unilateral measures by all the nuclear Powers, had profoundly changed the world. That progress could be attributed to the new international climate and to the good faith shown by the nuclear-weapon States

pursuant to their commitments under the non-proliferation Treaty. The Treaty regime provided a framework of stability, security and predictability which had permitted concerted implementation of a disarmament agenda.

16. Much remained to be done, however, and Latvia hoped that present and future nuclear disarmament agreements and commitments would be fully and rapidly implemented. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was within reach and until such an agreement was reached, Latvia urged all States to continue the current moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing. It awaited the commencement of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Such a convention, which must be non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable, would immeasurably increase confidence among all States. Negative and positive security assurances were an additional confidence-building measure. Latvia urged further negotiations on the expansion of such measures, including the conclusion of legally binding security assurances.

17. The relative success of the non-proliferation Treaty in curbing horizontal proliferation was due to the large number of States that were parties to it, who had put their trust in the non-proliferation regime knowing that most of their neighbours were also parties. However, in view of the gravity of the threat of proliferation, Latvia urged all States that were not parties, in particular the threshold States, to accede to it so that the Treaty might become universal by the end of the century.

18. Latvia had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and urged all States which had not fulfilled that obligation to do so as soon as possible. International cooperation and an effective system of verification were essential to collective security. States should have the assurance that information yielded by IAEA inspections was accurate and complete.

19. He recalled that during the general debate at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Latvia had called not only for a coalition for democracy but also for a fight against organized crime and the trafficking of nuclear materials and narcotics. Such coalitions were particularly relevant with regard to nuclear non-proliferation, since not only States but also individuals might have access to weapons of mass destruction. Urgent measures, including the development of regional arrangements, must be taken in order to strengthen borders and thus prevent uncontrolled movements of nuclear materials, and the financial resources needed to implement IAEA safeguards must be mobilized.

20. The non-proliferation Treaty was the only near-universal disarmament instrument. Its indefinite extension would make permanent the legal commitments contained therein. Any other decision would weaken the Treaty and the IAEA regime. The Treaty had helped to keep regional conflicts and tensions away from the nuclear arena, but that could change if the future of the Treaty was called into question.

21. It was important to acknowledge the significant disarmament steps taken by the nuclear-weapon States in implementing article VI of the Treaty. Indefinite extension of the Treaty would provide the stability and predictability that were necessary for further disarmament measures and for ensuring a world free of

nuclear arms, would discourage the non-nuclear-weapon States from hedging against the possible expiration of the Treaty and, lastly, would help to create a framework in which the threshold States could be prodded into acceding to the Treaty.

22. Mr. SAMASSEKOU (Mali) said that his country had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty because it believed that no security could be achieved through reliance on the possession of nuclear weapons. Mali had always encouraged all States to abide by their commitments under the Treaty which, despite its imperfections, particularly the imbalance between the rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, was the only instrument designed to halt the spread of the deadliest weapon ever known to man. As soon as it had become independent, Mali had called for an end to all nuclear tests, particularly in the Sahara.

23. The Treaty had achieved some remarkable successes, including the prevention of horizontal proliferation and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, but there were several defects in its functioning because some of its obligations had been breached; for instance, the nuclear Powers had been slow to honour their commitments under articles IV and VI of the Treaty and some non-nuclear-weapon States were seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite the glimmer of hope kindled by the unilateral and bilateral measures taken by the two major nuclear Powers, it was a source of concern that many "intermediate nuclear Powers" had emerged onto an international scene that had become more difficult to control.

24. With regard to the three alternatives proposed for paragraph 2 of article X of the Treaty, his delegation believed that in the absence of a comprehensive agreement on the destruction of all nuclear weapons, limited extension of the Treaty for a period of between 15 and 20 years might be one of the better proposals, on the understanding that any decision on the Treaty's future would have to be taken by consensus. The proposed period should be used to offer greater security guarantees, particularly for denuclearized regions such as Africa.

25. Speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of African States and on behalf of the 50 African States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, he wished to comment on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. After retracing the history of that issue, which dated back to the first nuclear tests in the Sahara, and recalling General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI), which considered Africa a denuclearized zone, and a resolution and solemn declaration of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), he said that Africa and OAU had set themselves the goals of keeping the African continent outside all spheres of rivalry and making it a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Since the establishment of a democratic regime in South Africa, that country had not only acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty but also renounced all its nuclear programmes. Africa's determination to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone was also evident in the OAU commitment since the 1990 declaration on the political and socio-economic situation of Africa, which sought to establish a climate of security conducive to economic development.

26. In order to promote the development of Africa, OAU had taken steps to halt internal conflicts on the continent. For example, it had established machinery for the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would help to strengthen those efforts by eliminating the risk of nuclear-weapons proliferation and the use of those weapons against African States. Africa was working for the universal application of the non-proliferation Treaty and urged the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate negotiations on the destruction of those weapons.

27. He mentioned the work of the Group of Experts responsible for drafting a treaty or convention on the denuclearization of Africa, the purpose of which was to prohibit nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He listed the various points covered in the draft, and particularly the problem of nuclear waste, and recalled that the Bamako Convention prohibited all dumping and storing of toxic waste on the continent. The instrument that was being drafted also dealt with the acquisition of nuclear technology for economic and social development purposes, the strengthening of regional and subregional cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of the African States to seek and obtain the necessary assistance and cooperation from the developed countries and the IAEA. A full-scope safeguards agreement, including a system of effective verification, should be concluded and administered with the IAEA.

28. Africa would only be viable as a nuclear-weapon-free zone if it received full and unconditional support from the international community. It called for positive and negative security assurances, to be embodied in a binding international legal instrument, in the form of a protocol annexed to the Treaty, to which the African States themselves would be parties. Africa's willingness to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons deserved to be matched by the offer of credible security assurances. In that connection, Africa welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995), but nevertheless considered that the current assurances should be strengthened and that strategic considerations should not prevent the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons.

29. Africa fervently hoped that nuclear energy would in future be used on the planet exclusively for peaceful purposes. A terrible threat was hanging over mankind. If it came from the South it would have been warded off, but it basically came from another direction. He urged the international community, with the approach of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, to show political will and join in building a new and peaceful world, free from fear of the apocalypse.

30. Mr. Wheeler (South Africa), Vice-President, took the Chair.

31. Mr. AL-ZAHAWI (Iraq) said that although previous speakers had mentioned Iraq as the example of a country seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, they had not mentioned it as an example in any other context because they were seeking to promote their policies in the region. What Iraq had had to endure since 1981 other States might have to endure in the future. The lesson from that experience was that a certain entity, while refusing to accede to the Treaty, had managed, by secret and illicit means, to acquire nuclear weapons,

not only with the knowledge of certain nuclear-weapon States but also with their assistance. Subsequently that entity had decided to take the law into its own hands and launched an armed attack against installations which, as they belonged to a State party to the Treaty, were covered by safeguards. That had not protected that State from the attack nor from a repetition of such attacks, repeatedly threatened by the aggressor. The Security Council and IAEA had stated that that attack constituted a serious threat for the entire IAEA safeguards system, on which the non-proliferation Treaty was based, and they had adopted resolutions asking the aggressor to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards and to refrain in future from committing acts of that kind or threatening to commit them. Several years had elapsed but the resolutions had remained a dead letter because the Council and the international community had done nothing to ensure their implementation. The reason was that the authorities of one of the nuclear-weapon States considered that the aggressor in question was entitled to acquire a nuclear capability and to act as it pleased because, as they put it, it behaved in a rational and responsible manner. They pretended to forget that that entity had threatened to bring out the nuclear bomb that it kept "hidden in the basement", not to defend its existence but to hold on to the territories it had occupied, settled and annexed by force. In that entity there was a powerful opposition party which was expected to win the forthcoming elections and which was urging that not a single inch of the occupied territories should be surrendered, and was ready, in its fanaticism, to go to any lengths, whatever the cost. It was not hard to see what that party would do with its nuclear bomb. Nevertheless, the nuclear-weapon State in question was not changing its policy towards the entity, on which it was lavishing financial resources, weapons and nuclear cooperation.

32. There was also another State, which was not a party to the Treaty and which had succeeded in acquiring certain nuclear capabilities without having to steal material or equipment or any other components or contravene the laws of the great Power in question or of any other State, unlike the other entity. However, the great Power was imposing a blockade on that State and an arms embargo, although it had already paid for its weapons. It was hard to see the justice in such biased policies and one wondered how independent States, large or small, could ensure their safety, exercise their rights and put their trust in ambiguous and illusory safeguards that failed to protect them against murderous acts of aggression.

33. Iraq, in keeping with Security Council resolution 687 (1991), had for four years submitted to strict nuclear controls and was fully cooperating in that sphere, as had been acknowledged by the IAEA. In paragraph 14 of the above-mentioned resolution, the Council noted that the actions to be taken by Iraq represented steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery. Not only had nothing been done in that area but the only State in the region which had not signed the Treaty and which possessed nuclear weapons was still refusing to accede to it. As for the great Power which was protecting that State, and which was behind the above-mentioned resolution, it was neither applying the provisions of that paragraph of the resolution nor reacting to the intransigence of its protege, although it was trying to make other States of the region apply the provisions of the Treaty when they would thereby renounce the exercise of their legitimate rights to equality and to ensure their security.

34. Iraq considered that the Conference should take those facts into consideration in order to avoid any discrimination. Otherwise, by exempting one State from applying the provisions of the Treaty while expecting others to respect it forever, there would inevitably be attempts to restore a certain balance. That meant an arms race, whether secret or public. It would therefore be unwise for the Conference to ignore that reality or to close its eyes to the consequences.

35. The objective was to safeguard the interests of all parties without granting privileges to a minority and depriving the majority of its right to equality, and even endangering its security and its future. Efforts must therefore be made either to establish equity and equilibrium or - preferably - to attain the ultimate goal sought by all mankind, namely the complete and permanent elimination of the nuclear threat.

36. If there had been any equilibrium at the beginning, the world would not have experienced the atrocities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Without the balance subsequently achieved in the world, the cold war would not have remained cold. One might thus consider the case of the war waged by the United States against Viet Nam as an example of the role played by nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence. Kissinger had stated that the Kennedy team wrongly thought there was nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, which made a general war unthinkable. McNamara had said that Eisenhower, under the Johnson presidency in 1965, had advised the United States Government to threaten the Chinese and Soviets with the atomic bomb if they themselves threatened to intervene in Viet Nam.

37. If Eisenhower, who was considered to have been one of the great presidents of the United States, had advised the use of nuclear weapons, one shudders at the thought of what might have happened if the United States had not considered that there was parity with the Soviet Union. In spite of that conviction, United States generals, such as General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, had threatened to drop the atomic bomb on North Viet Nam.

38. Apparently, the military and civilian leaders of the United States were very attached to the idea of atomic bombing designed to destroy a city or an entire country, since their experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The wife of President Reagan had stated that General Alexander Haig, Secretary of State, had requested the United States Security Council to have Cuba turned into a parking lot. General Michael Dugan, another Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, had stated in the Washington Post of 16 September 1990 that the United States was planning to conduct a massive bombardment of the centre of Baghdad and to eliminate the President and his family. General Dugan had also requested experts to tell him what Iraqis considered to be the most sacred Muslim site in Iraq so as to bomb it. At the beginning of 1991, the Secretary of State, James Baker, threatened to bomb Iraq back to the pre-industrial era. The United States Air Force had complied by unleashing more than 120,000 tons of bombs on Iraq, a total force representing more than the atomic bombs launched against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, the United Nations representative, Mr. Maarti Ahtissari, had stated in his report to the Secretary-General, that Iraq had indeed been bombed back to the pre-industrial era. What annoyed certain people was that Iraq, thanks to the determination of the Iraqis and the

resolution of their leaders, had been able to reconstruct the country and defy the plans of the United States. It was clear from all the statements and descriptions that those were not isolated cases but were constantly recurring in the thoughts and behaviour of the United States.

39. It was unlikely that Mr. McNamara felt guilty about the murderous attack on Viet Nam and its neighbours for he had planned to list the Vietnamese killed so as to prove the success of United States policy. In fact, the cause of his guilt was the deaths of 58,000 United States soldiers brought about as a result of that policy.

40. It might be wondered whether Viet Nam could have saved its 3 million victims if it had been able to make the United States hesitate before it launched its attack.

41. McNamara had stated that he had written his book in order to avoid wars against nationalists whose emotional power could not be reduced to silence by United States bombs.

42. At present that stage was over and the moment had come to achieve the fundamental aim of the Treaty and to work seriously in favour of the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth and to ensure the future of coming generations.

43. Meanwhile, the most urgent task was to define a precise timetable for the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons and their elimination, the universal implementation of the Treaty, the establishment of a non-discriminatory regime regarding the transfer of nuclear technology to countries that were not parties to the treaty.

44. Finally, he reaffirmed the Arab position set forth in the resolution adopted in March 1995 by the Council of the Arab League, namely, that the endorsement of the status quo, which compelled all the States of the Middle East except Israel to respect the Treaty, was a serious mistake which threatened peace and stability in the region and was therefore unacceptable.

45. Mr. HOROI (Solomon Islands) said it was against a backdrop of profound change in political and security relations that the Conference was now considering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was therefore an historic occasion on which to decide the future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference should therefore concentrate on the substantive issues of the Treaty's implementation, particularly on nuclear disarmament under article VI. The Conference must focus not only on the record but also on concrete ways to improve it. It must be improved drastically and quickly. Nuclear danger was a global problem and it required a global solution. The decisions to be made during the next few weeks would affect the very future of the earth. Even a small developing nation like Solomon Islands had a view about the world and relied on a healthy environment for its survival. It was therefore acutely aware of the need to protect its natural resources from nuclear contamination.

46. Solomon Islands was concerned about French testing in the Pacific and the possibility of nuclear wars or explosions anywhere in the world. Nothing short of the total and final elimination of all nuclear weapons for all time would convince his country that such a nightmare would not one day happen. The experience of the last 25 years did not yet give it confidence of the commitment of the world's nations and especially the nuclear-weapons States to that end.

47. If the world kept going in the present direction without a committed, global effort to delegitimize and to ban under international inspection the possession of nuclear weapons by anyone - as chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction were now banned - it was likely to experience within coming decades not only threats but actual explosions of Hiroshima-size bombs in regional wars or terrorist acts. And that prospect threatened the Solomon Islands along with every other nation in the world.

48. Solomon Islands had experienced first-hand the devastation and suffering of war. In addition, it had been affected throughout the cold war by nuclear weapons testing and other related activities. Those experiences had had a profound influence on its efforts to promote peace and nuclear disarmament internationally and on its deep commitment to the goal of world peace and security. Solomon Islands played an active role in the South Pacific Forum, other regional organizations and the United Nations and its major agencies. Its commitment to regional and international cooperation and peace was reflected in the adoption of the following measures.

49. Solomon Islands, together with other members of the South Pacific Forum, had agreed to adopt the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty in 1985 (Treaty of Rarotonga). It considered that Treaty to be the region's central contribution to the strengthening of global security and the international non-proliferation regime. It was with deep regret that Solomon Islands noted that, among the nuclear-weapon States, Russia and China had ratified the protocols of that Treaty but France, the United Kingdom and the United States had not. The Solomon Islands considered that the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in all regions of the world was an important objective in the world quest for total nuclear disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had shown the way, followed by the Treaty of Rarotonga; the members of ASEAN were ready to finalize a draft treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in South East Asia; the countries of Africa were also ready to create such a zone. The Solomon Islands hoped that those moves would encourage similar initiatives in other parts of Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

50. In 1993, its concern over the health and environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons had led Solomon Islands, together with other members of the World Health Organization (WHO) to vote in favour of a request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In 1994, it had joined 77 other nations in supporting General Assembly resolution 49/75 K, urgently requesting the Court for a second and more comprehensive Advisory Opinion, on the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Solomon Islands would continue to participate actively in those proceedings and hoped that they would spur on the efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and to eliminate nuclear weapons completely.

51. While his country welcomed the efforts of the United States and Russia to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, it must be noted that the joint level of 7,000 strategic warheads to be achieved by the year 2003 if the START II Agreement was implemented, that would involve almost exactly the same number that the United States and Russia had deployed in 1970 when the Treaty entered into force 25 years ago. Unless his delegation heard commitments that START III negotiations would aim at further deep reductions below the 1970 level and that the other nuclear States were ready to join in disarmament negotiations at last, it would have little choice but to conclude that the nuclear-weapon States did not take seriously their article VI commitment to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons. That would have profound consequences for the future of international relations and of the Treaty itself. Likewise, the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to agree even on a draft of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the opening of the present Conference was deeply disturbing. It had given rise to concern that after the Conference adjourned they might turn their backs on their obligation to ban all nuclear explosions for all time. Instead, they might agree to a low-yield threshold treaty, allowing sizeable explosions which would permit further development of nuclear weapons and would spur rather than inhibit proliferation.

52. The success of the Conference would be judged not only by a decision to extend the Treaty but also on the demonstrated political will of the parties to implement the Treaty, including article VI, and to reform and strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

53. While the Treaty had proved an invaluable tool in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was not sufficient to extend it indefinitely without wholehearted support by a broad consensus. Both the Treaty itself and the commitments towards disarmament required to achieve its goals merited the affirmation of the Conference by overwhelming votes, freely given. The security of the international community demanded no less.

54. The Solomon Islands wished to stress the vital need for the parties to the Conference to commit themselves to taking additional concrete steps to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Without such steps, the Treaty could not attain its dual objectives of ending nuclear-weapons proliferation and bringing about the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons. The current regime gave nuclear-weapon States too much latitude, allowing them to retain large nuclear arsenals. Global political consensus was needed in order to implement the measures that would strengthen and reform the non-proliferation regime, but unless the nuclear Powers committed themselves once more to their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty and took immediate and concrete steps to carry them out, that consensus would not be sustained. The current pace of progress towards the abolition of nuclear weapons was insufficient and deeply troubling, particularly in light of the historic opportunities that had emerged with the end of the cold war. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were inextricably linked. It would soon be all or nothing, abolition or proliferation. Either all nations would forgo the right to possess and threaten the use of nuclear weapons, or every nation would claim that right, and many nations and groups would act on it. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and give effect to article VI, the nuclear-weapon States should immediately set a date for the start of

negotiations on a convention to eliminate nuclear weapons - in which negotiations the undeclared nuclear-weapon States and threshold States should participate. There should also be a target date for the completion of those negotiations by the year 2000.

55. The Review and Extension Conference itself should be a forum in which the parties affirmed their political commitment to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Those commitments should be included in the Conference's final document or in a statement of comparable importance. Progress or lack of progress in implementing those mutual obligations should be measured and assessed in a far more rigorous way than was currently the case with the five-year NPT Review Conferences. The Solomon Islands urged all parties to the Treaty to affirm, in a strongly worded final Conference document, their commitment to implementing the following measures: (1) elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, particularly by the five nuclear Powers, and commitment by those Powers to negotiate a nuclear-weapons convention by the year 2000; (2) adoption of a multilateral and truly comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that would ban all nuclear explosions for all time, leaving no loopholes; (3) establishment of safeguards on fissile materials from dismantled weapons and verification of the destruction of all warheads, and extension of bilateral or international safeguards; (4) banning of the production of fissile materials; (5) negative security assurances and binding commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; and (6) improvement of non-proliferation safeguards by rigorous assessment of how States parties carried out their obligations.

56. If those commitments were made during the Conference there would be overwhelming and wholehearted support for indefinite extension of the Treaty, and the Solomon Islands would enthusiastically join that consensus.

57. Mr. GUVEN (Turkey) pointed out that, with the end of the cold war, the arms control process had entered a new phase. The new environment had made it possible to conclude agreements on disarmament dealing, inter alia, with conventional armed forces in Europe and chemical weapons. In the nuclear field, 1994 had marked two important steps forward, with the negotiation of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the consultations on a treaty that would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. However, despite all those encouraging new developments, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was far from over.

58. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the main building block of the international non-proliferation regime and the most widely supported multilateral arms control agreement. It had proved its value in safeguarding international peace, strengthening the security of States and promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Turkey believed that strict adherence to its provisions was of crucial importance. Nuclear power plants were but one of several ways to produce energy, and nuclear installations should be operated at all times in strict conformity with IAEA safeguards and the principles of the Treaty.

59. The success of the non-proliferation regime depended not only on the adoption of treaties but also on compliance with their provisions. In the case of the non-proliferation Treaty, the safeguards contained in article III were

designed for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Strengthening such safeguards was an important element of nuclear arms control and of non-proliferation. His delegation strongly supported the approach taken and the recommendations contained in the recent report of the IAEA Director General on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, which was the outcome of the "Programme 93 + 2".

60. The Treaty also set out an agenda for nuclear disarmament and the parties had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. It was worth recalling the obligations relating to non-proliferation stemming from the relevant preambular paragraphs and article VI. He noted with satisfaction that the nuclear Powers had recently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament, and that significant and concrete progress had been made in that area since the end of the cold war. However much still remained to be done and in that connection he drew attention to the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, consultations on a treaty which would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and positive and negative security assurances.

61. Some progress had been accomplished in the past on the subject of limiting the environments within which nuclear tests could be undertaken or limiting their yield; however that was not enough to attain the non-proliferation goals. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty which would be truly comprehensive and verifiable would therefore be a vital step in that direction. Another important step would be the early conclusion of a treaty providing for a cut-off in the production of fissile materials. Turkey expressed its satisfaction at the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had finally decided to establish and an hoc committee to start negotiations on that issue. It hoped that the remaining differences of opinion would soon be ironed out.

62. In the meantime, Turkey shared the security concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States and it welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) noting that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the five permanent members of the Security Council had given the non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty security assurances against the use of such weapons.

63. Turkey supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, since it believed that the main objectives of the Treaty - strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament - could only be achieved through a treaty that was universally adhered to and indefinitely extended. Such an instrument could only strengthen international peace and security.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/SR.11
26 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 24 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. DHANAPALA	(Sri Lanka)
later:	Mr. HASMY (Vice-President)	(Malaysia)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that the Conference had a historic mandate; it would determine whether or not future generations would live under the threat of nuclear annihilation. It should decide the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the basis of a comprehensive review of the events of the past 25 years, and should be guided by the objectives of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and promoting development through the application of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. The international community realized that peace and development were two sides of the same coin. That duality was embodied in the Treaty through the principles that nuclear weapons were a danger to international peace and security, and that peaceful applications of nuclear energy should be made universally available, subject to non-proliferation commitments. The Philippines, for its part, pursued a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

3. Despite the considerable number of States parties, their attachment to the Treaty could be rendered useless if one or a few States refused to be part of the non-proliferation regime; above all, the Conference should call for universal accession.

4. The non-nuclear-weapon States were fulfilling their non-proliferation obligations, either voluntarily or compelled by verification and inspection. However, the existence of a small number of de facto nuclear-weapon States was of the utmost concern. Moreover, many non-nuclear-weapon States parties had yet to comply with their obligations to conclude and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They should be urged to rectify that situation. In that regard, the Philippines supported the strengthening of the international nuclear safeguards system.

5. The Conference should commend the various initiatives for the creation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. All States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should be urged to support such initiatives, and the nuclear-weapon States should respect the zones, especially a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

6. After 25 years, nuclear disarmament - the crux of the non-proliferation regime - had not been fully realized. Consequently, the campaign of the nuclear-weapon States for indefinite extension had been interpreted as an attempt to perpetuate an unjust status quo. The Philippines urged immediate negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-disarmament treaty, in which all nuclear-weapon States, whether declared or de facto, would take part; that treaty should spell out the steps to be taken towards full nuclear disarmament, as well as the time-frame for its accomplishment.

7. The nuclear-weapon States should also be asked to declare to the Conference that they renounced nuclear weapons as instruments of war; that they would conclude forthwith a comprehensive test-ban treaty; and that they would pursue interim steps towards, inter alia, a cut-off convention banning production of all weapon-usable fissile materials, a treaty against first use of nuclear weapons, and a treaty containing positive and negative security assurances.

8. The Philippines also supported the establishment in the United Nations of a register of nuclear arsenals to serve as a benchmark in the disarmament process.

9. The issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy presented a challenge in terms of peace and prosperity, necessitating an integrated approach to disarmament, collective security and economic and scientific cooperation. The Conference should call for such an approach, which should include a strengthened commitment for transfer of technology and technical cooperation to assist developing countries.

10. He agreed with the Secretary-General of the United Nations that there should be no diplomatic brinkmanship with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Non-proliferation and disarmament should not be a matter for bargaining. Prompt action should be taken to put the obligations under article VI into effect. Negotiations towards stopping further development of nuclear weapons and towards eliminating them should be pursued in good faith. Only the indefinite extension of the Treaty could provide the needed stability. It was the paradox of the Treaty that, in order to make the nuclear non-proliferation regime unnecessary, through nuclear disarmament, the Treaty must continue in force indefinitely. Once the international community attained the goal of the irreversible total abolition of nuclear weapons, the question of the Treaty remaining in force would be irrelevant, except with regard to the sharing of benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

11. Mr. KOZYREV (Russian Federation) said that the outcome of the Conference would determine whether the future was stable and predictable or fraught with the danger of a new nuclear confrontation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was a document which, on the basis of compromise, had brought together the most varied States - large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. It served the common interest of ensuring stability, averting the nuclear threat and promoting disarmament and, for a disarmament agreement, had attracted a record number of States parties, which needed the Treaty as a guarantee of both national and universal interests.

12. It was said that the Treaty was ineffective. However, it had unquestionably limited the spread of nuclear weapons; there were still only five nuclear Powers and the provisions of the Treaty had become inalienable norms of international law and civilized behaviour. It was significant that South Africa had voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons and had acceded as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It was largely because of the existence of the Treaty that, in the turmoil of the breakup of the USSR, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States had been avoided and Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Russian Federation applauded the wisdom of its friends and partners in the Commonwealth of Independent

States; their accession had strengthened the Treaty and the reliability of non-proliferation.

13. The Treaty had become an appreciable factor in the strengthening of regional stability; one could imagine what might have happened in the areas of local conflicts in the absence of the Treaty. The non-proliferation norm underlying the Treaty had also become a starting point for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the harmonized statements of the nuclear Powers on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty constituted a further contribution to the strengthening of international stability and security and had become possible because of the Treaty.

14. To the doubts and questions raised about the obligations in the Treaty to halt the nuclear-arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, the Russian Federation, along with other States, had an unequivocal answer: the nuclear-arms race had been halted and reversed. That was indisputable. By mid-1991, an entire class of nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States had been eliminated. Under the START I Treaty, the two largest nuclear arsenals had been reduced almost by half; with the ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States would reduce their strategic offensive arms to one third, and they had also agreed to start deactivating all the strategic carriers that were subject to reduction.

15. The leaders of both countries recognized the need for further reductions and limitations in the remaining nuclear forces and had instructed their experts to accelerate work on possible reductions after the ratification of START II. The Russian Federation's agreements with the United States, China and the United Kingdom on the detargeting of their strategic nuclear forces were an important means of strengthening strategic stability and trust. The Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces were no longer targeted against anyone.

16. The Russian Federation was committed to the final goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It proposed that all the nuclear-weapon States should proceed towards that goal, t-king into account the specific nature of their nuclear potential, and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments. That objective could be achieved under the treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly (A/49/PV.5). The Russian Federation was gratified that, just before the Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom and France had joined it in making a statement solemnly reaffirming their commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/20).

17. Among the major landmarks on the road to nuclear disarmament were the prohibition of nuclear tests for all time. An indefinite, universal treaty, subject to effective international control, was within reach. The Russian Federation was in favour of signing it in 1995. It was continuing to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests, which had been repeatedly extended. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and subsequent renunciation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons would further strengthen the non-proliferation regime but would be possible only if the Non-Proliferation Treaty was in effect.

18. Another pressing issue was the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the Russian Federation a programme was under way to shut down the remaining facilities which had previously produced plutonium for weapons purposes; moreover, the plutonium already produced was not being used for those purposes. The production of weapon-grade uranium had been stopped several years previously. The Russian Federation would strive to ensure that the ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament began work as soon as possible on that issue.

19. The Russian Federation favoured a progressive and irreversible process of nuclear disarmament. Yet it remained realistic. The implementation of disarmament programmes showed that it was impossible to get rid of nuclear weapons overnight. The elimination of inherited nuclear arsenals was a costly process which involved solving major technical and financial problems.

20. The Russian Federation had consistently supported the IAEA safeguards as an effective verification instrument fostering confidence that all States parties were abiding by the Treaty and that unauthorized activity would be detected and terminated. The IAEA safeguards constituted a verification mechanism for non-proliferation and at the same time a powerful confidence-building measure. The Russian Federation was participating in upgrading the safeguards system.

21. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had created a favourable climate for continuously broadening international cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom for decades to come; the Russian Federation was prepared to develop such cooperation further, including cooperation with developing countries, whether through IAEA or on a bilateral basis. However, there must be an assurance that the Treaty would continue in effect.

22. The Russian Federation firmly favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty; it would be inexcusable to miss the historic opportunity to achieve such an extension, thereby demolishing the foundations of international stability; in a world where the "logic" of the nuclear-arms race had only recently been defeated, that would be an inadmissible retreat. The indefinite extension of the Treaty would ensure that all its positive achievements were preserved and enhanced; it would not be a mandate for the nuclear Powers to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, but would offer the prospect of progressive movement towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

23. The Russian Federation believed that the decision on the Treaty should be an open and clear expression of the will of the States parties. If it was not possible to take the decision on the basis of consensus, an open vote must be held. The States parties had the right to know each other's position with regard to the future of the Treaty; it was only on that basis that broad mutual trust, which had become one of the most important gains of the Treaty, could continue. It was the duty of each Government to state openly and unequivocally its position in its vote.

24. The Russian Federation welcomed all the new parties to the Treaty and expressed satisfaction that, with the accession of China and France, all the nuclear-weapon States had become parties. It hoped that the few countries which still remained outside the Treaty would soon find it possible to join. It

called upon all States parties to make every effort to ensure that the Conference helped strengthen the Treaty through its indefinite and unconditional extension. The Treaty must remain one of the key pillars of the security system in the modern world.

25. Mr. DI TELLA (Argentina) said that the presence of his delegation carried special significance, since his Government had formally signed the instrument of accession in February 1995. Argentina was committed to the preservation of international peace and security, and remained convinced that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was a crucial condition for achieving that goal.

26. He recalled that the Non-Proliferation Treaty implied a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to progress towards the total elimination of such weapons. In the absence of such progress, the imbalance between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would result in distrust and disillusionment among the latter.

27. It was in the regional context that nuclear proliferation took on its most destabilizing dimension; such senseless competition among neighbours fed on itself, resulting in a weakening of global peace. It was for that reason that Argentina and Brazil had decided to move towards closer ties in their respective nuclear policies. Their gradual coming together had led them to coordinate their efforts with Chile, and to endorse the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He welcomed the current strengthening and extension of that Treaty, including its recent endorsement by Cuba, which was an important step towards the consolidation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

28. The current near-universal endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an overwhelming response to the question of its validity and significance. Argentina believed that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. That extension was necessary to ensure both the maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Were the international community to question the extension of the Treaty, much could be lost. Also, its partial or qualified extension would set the world on a slippery slope. The principle of unquestioned, near-universal endorsement would be challenged, favouring the position of those who sought to obtain nuclear weaponry by illegitimate means. In 1992, in a historic statement, the Security Council had recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to international peace and security; it would be ironic if that statement were to be followed by a weakening of the Treaty. The latter situation would also be in contradiction with strong, binding regional agreements such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For all those reasons, he hoped that an overwhelming majority of parties to the Treaty would reaffirm its validity.

29. The Conference should also focus on the need to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, in order to deal with situations such as those that had arisen since 1990. Situations in which parties were able to commit violations of the Treaty should no longer be allowed to occur.

30. Argentina, which had a highly developed nuclear industry, was a responsible importer and exporter of nuclear technology. It was essential to implement a strict and effective system of international safeguards as a necessary condition for nuclear cooperation and technology transfer. Furthermore, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be facilitated to the extent that the safeguards system adapted to new realities. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a strait-jacket; it was the guarantee Argentina needed to develop fully the capacities of its peaceful nuclear industry.

31. The Conference should be fully aware of the importance of strengthening and promoting international legislation on the physical protection of nuclear materials; the transportation of radioactive waste, as well as materials such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, was a cause for great concern in terms of contamination. It was desirable to improve the effectiveness of the relevant instruments, which would be very important in the event of an environmental emergency.

32. He expressed his Government's satisfaction at the ending of the nuclear-arms race and the progressive reduction of arsenals. Such progress pointed the way for the future. Special efforts should be made to finalize the comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1995.

33. Argentina considered that the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) reflected the willingness of the five permanent members to review the legitimate claims of non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain assurances against their use or the threat thereof. The Non-Proliferation Treaty upheld the principle that the international community was responsible for preventing the horrors of nuclear war. All States had the duty to do whatever was necessary to ensure that the twenty-first century would begin with firmly established arrangements for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Argentina was firmly committed to that goal.

34. Mr. KURDI (Saudi Arabia) congratulated the States which had recently acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, bringing it closer to universality. He urged all States which had not yet become parties to do so as soon as possible.

35. The goal of international peace and security was in the forefront of the aims of the United Nations, as were the principles of the peaceful resolution of disputes and of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations. It was noteworthy that the first resolution of the General Assembly, in 1946, had called for the elimination, not only of nuclear weapons, but of all weapons of mass destruction.

36. One of the key opportunities of the post-cold-war era was the ability of States to refrain from the use of force in settling disputes. Experience had shown that security was not achieved through the stockpiling of weapons, and that possessing weapons of mass destruction did not protect States or guarantee international peace and security. The possibility of a third world war in the nuclear age represented a plausible threat to humanity.

37. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was of particular concern to the Arab States. The League of Arab States, at its latest session, had reiterated its support for

the objectives of the Treaty and for the goal of universality. The effectiveness of the Treaty should be enhanced through the IAEA safeguards system. Saudi Arabia was committed to refraining from the possession, development or use of nuclear weapons, and continued to pursue the objective of making the Middle East a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. It had supported all international initiatives to that end and called upon all States in the region to cooperate seriously in achieving such a noble objective.

38. In view of the threat to regional peace presented by the Israeli refusal to join the Treaty, he called upon the Conference to endorse making the Middle East a region free of all weapons of mass destruction, and also called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards.

39. Although the Treaty had been instrumental in limiting nuclear proliferation, it had not completely succeeded in limiting their horizontal and vertical spread. The absence of effective international supervision constituted a dangerous loophole in the Treaty, one that could be remedied by establishing continuous supervision of nuclear facilities, as well as by means of satellite monitoring or by random surprise inspections.

40. The strengthening of IAEA safeguards and Security Council guarantees of a universal application of the Treaty would enhance its effectiveness. However, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties also required guarantees that the Security Council would take immediate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in the event that one of them was subjected to aggression or the threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was an important step to that end, but further steps were required. Other basic requirements for achieving the objectives of the Treaty were the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a treaty prohibiting the production or stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, as well as additional steps by the nuclear Powers to achieve nuclear disarmament. His delegation earnestly looked forward to the fulfilment of Security Council commitments to prevent the spread of technology related to weapons of mass destruction, implement IAEA safeguards and export controls, and guarantee the universal application of Treaty provisions for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

41. Mr. INSANALLY (Guyana) said that his delegation welcomed the recent increase in the number of States acceding to the Treaty, but the implementation of the Treaty could be improved. The nuclear-weapon States could strengthen the Treaty by introducing more decisive disarmament measures, and could enhance the welfare of those States which had voluntarily renounced the nuclear option by agreeing to a legally binding international instrument against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Beyond simply debating the extension of the Treaty, therefore, the Conference should also examine the actions required to satisfy more fully the Treaty's objectives; his Government was of the view that additional political impetus must be given to the operation of the Treaty.

42. The parties to the Treaty must curb the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons, and also accept IAEA safeguards against the illegal diversion of fissionable material. Given the apparent compulsion of nations to test and improve the nuclear weapons in their possession, however, nothing short of complete nuclear disarmament would secure the world from the potential

catastrophe of nuclear war. Nuclear energy should be devoted only to peaceful purposes, but the major nuclear-weapon States had yet to undertake the appropriate transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis and at low financial cost. The non-nuclear-weapon States should not be expected to conform to the Treaty on terms laid down by the nuclear Powers in the absence of firm guarantees that the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States would not be harmed. In the unequal conditions characterizing the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States had a greater obligation to bring about complete denuclearization.

43. Because it was persuaded that nuclear non-proliferation was in the best interests of the international community, Guyana would continue to uphold the Treaty as a necessary instrument for the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. In principle, Guyana did not oppose the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but an indefinite extension without conditions would remove all incentive to fully honour its obligations. Periodic review of implementation as called for under article VIII must therefore be strengthened as a guarantee of compliance by all parties. Indefinite extension had been made more acceptable by the commitment of the major nuclear-weapon States under Security Council resolution 984 (1995), as well as their unilateral declarations of readiness to provide appropriate guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such guarantees should, however, be incorporated in treaty form.

44. In conclusion, Guyana called for the reconciliation of the positions of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States in determining the future of the Treaty. Such a reconciliation could only be achieved if all parties demonstrated full respect for its provisions and placed them above narrow concerns.

45. Mr. AZWAI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) called upon the Conference to remedy the many shortcomings of the Treaty and renew the participants' commitment to making it truly universal. Nuclear arsenals had greatly increased during the past 25 years, and the world had failed so far to agree on a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and on banning the stockpiling of fissionable materials for military purposes. Moreover, there was a glaring discrepancy in that non-nuclear-weapon States parties were subject to IAEA safeguards while the nuclear-weapon States were not. The latter had not helped the non-nuclear-weapon States gain access to peaceful nuclear technology, but had ironically been involved in transferring nuclear technology to countries that were not parties to the Treaty. He called upon the Conference to address those negative aspects of the Treaty in the interests of collective security.

46. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya appreciated the decision by South Africa to dismantle its nuclear weapons, and joined the countries of the Middle East in seeking to make the region free of all weapons of mass destruction. However, Israel's possession of a nuclear arsenal and its refusal to accede to the Treaty or to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards constituted a threat to the security and stability of the region, as well as a provocation of all the Arab peoples.

47. His country supported the aims of the Treaty, but called upon the nuclear-weapon States to apply its provisions even-handedly and to set target dates for

getting rid of their nuclear stockpiles. It further called for universal accession to the Treaty, as well as the nuclear disarmament of Israel and the destruction of its nuclear stockpiles. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya insisted that Israel should not remain outside the framework of the Treaty, with its nuclear facilities exempt from the IAEA safeguards regime, and would agree to an extension of the Treaty only if Israel were compelled to dismantle all the nuclear weapons in its possession.

48. Mr. PEERTHUM (Mauritius) said that the changing international circumstances had made it even more imperative to attain the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Unfortunately, the realization of that objective remained but a dream because of the emotional approach that had characterized the debate thus far.

49. From the very outset, the developing countries, speaking through the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, had called and continued to call for a comprehensive test ban, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, a freeze on and the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and assurances of security for non-nuclear-weapon States, as tangible steps towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of existing stocks of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Had the international community been able to summon the collective political will to genuinely address the aspirations of the Non-Aligned Movement, the world would have been closer to achieving that ideal. Regrettably, the four preparatory sessions had failed to solve even procedural - let alone substantive - questions. Indeed, it was difficult to understand the reasons for the international community's failure to have a thorough review of the Treaty and to take stock of its implementation thus far with a view to strengthening it. After 25 years of a so-called non-proliferation regime, little progress had been made towards eliminating nuclear weapons, and States parties appeared to be more engrossed in whether to extend the Treaty indefinitely, a move which, paradoxically, would legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear Powers.

50. Clearly, the letter and spirit of the Treaty had not been observed and several of its articles had been ignored, resulting in the spread of nuclear arsenals beyond the original five nuclear-weapon States. Little progress had been made towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty or a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. It should be recalled, however, that the Treaty was the outcome of the fears and hopes generated by the cold war. Things had changed since then, and it was therefore timely that the review should take into consideration current realities.

51. His delegation considered that it was essential to have the Treaty as long as nuclear weapons continued to exist. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective should be to eliminate nuclear weapons and not to have a Treaty which legitimized their existence. The Treaty needed to be strengthened; a mere extension, whether for fixed periods or indefinitely, would not eliminate its weaknesses, particularly the loopholes which had enabled certain States either to acquire or be on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons while being parties to the Treaty.

52. Non-nuclear-weapon States needed assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While Security Council resolution 984 (1995) addressed the issue, it did not go far enough. In that connection, the non-nuclear-weapon States welcomed China's strong call for the early conclusion of an international convention on the non-first use of nuclear weapons and an international legal instrument assuring non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

53. His delegation would also welcome the further strengthening of IAEA safeguards to bring them up to date with technological advancements. It was a matter of concern that, in addition to the current difficulties of applying those safeguards to the traditional ways of diverting weapon-grade materials, new challenges to the safeguards regime were emerging from the latest technologies entering civilian use, such as the laser-enrichment technology which enabled quick and economic production of enriched uranium.

54. The current focus on the question of whether to approve an indefinite extension of the Treaty defeated the purpose of the Conference, which should review the implementation of the Treaty before considering its extension. Indeed, the current number of non-nuclear-weapon States could not be stated with accuracy. If the Treaty was to be the cornerstone of non-proliferation, the international community should encourage universal accession to it by addressing its shortcomings. There was no reason why the Treaty could not be amended, where necessary, in pursuit of the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Conference would thereby demonstrate that it was willing to work towards a conclusion that was satisfactory to all States parties.

55. PRINCE SISOWATH Sirirath (Cambodia) said that, although the Treaty prevented the spread of nuclear weapons, the international community remained deeply concerned about their continued existence. Many believed that the Treaty was weak and unreliable, especially in the light of recent discoveries concerning the clandestine nuclear programme of certain States parties. His delegation therefore urged all States parties to cooperate fully with IAEA, which, in turn, should strengthen its safeguards system in order to detect clandestine nuclear activities.

56. Despite the planned two-thirds reduction of nuclear weapons, some of the non-nuclear-weapon States were concerned that nuclear-weapon States continued to upgrade their nuclear-armament technology and other States parties acquired the technical know-how to produce their own weapons, with the knowledge and help of the nuclear-weapon States. Cambodia, a non-nuclear-weapon State, wished to reiterate its pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. However, nuclear-weapon States must address the mounting concern of those who believed that the Treaty had benefited only the industrialized countries and their allies by applying a double standard.

57. Every sovereign nation had a legal right to acquire nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes, provided that it agreed to inspections and cooperated fully with IAEA. Failure to acknowledge that right would reduce the incentive of States parties to the Treaty which already possessed nuclear reactors to work within international structures for nuclear cooperation.

58. Some even talked of withdrawing from the Treaty in order to force the nuclear-weapon States to disarm. Such action, however, might have the opposite effect. Tremendous progress had been made towards disarmament, even though much remained to be done. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty negotiations were well engaged, and that agreement had been reached on negotiating a mandate for the Conference on Disarmament to cut off the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It was also encouraging to note that IAEA was strengthening its application of the safeguards regime.

59. His delegation welcomed the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. For its part, the United States had recently provided answers to the fundamental questions which had long preoccupied the non-nuclear-weapon States; it had matched its words with deeds. Moreover, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) went a long way towards providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty.

60. For all those reasons, his delegation supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. The international community should, however, go a step further and begin to work towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It hoped that the Conference would support the extension of the Treaty, preferably by consensus, in order to strengthen its implementation.

61. Mr. TOKAEV (Kazakhstan) said that, since the invention of nuclear weapons, the threat of the annihilation of civilization had become tangible. It had taken the world community a long time to realize that the interdependency of States meant that conflicts, if not neutralized in time, could endanger global stability. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had been a fairly reliable instrument for preventing an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States, and a correspondingly increased threat of the escalation of conflicts into nuclear war. The changes brought about by the end of the cold war highlighted the urgent need to resolve the issue of nuclear arsenals in a responsible manner.

62. Kazakhstan had had to face the complex task of mastering the specifics of global nuclear politics and determining its status and position on the various issues of nuclear disarmament. From the very first days of independence, President Nazarbaev had followed a course of freeing Kazakhstan from nuclear weapons. That had been a natural choice for a State that had suffered so much from nuclear tests: 459 nuclear explosions (113 of them in the atmosphere) had been carried out in Kazakhstan. Those tests had seriously affected the life and health of the population and the ecological balance of the vast territory. Over 500,000 Kazakhs had been subjected to radiation during the 43 years of operation of the Semipalatinsk nuclear-testing ground. In December 1993, Kazakhstan had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby taking an important step in implementing its foreign policy of peace and adherence to the universally recognized norms of conduct in international security issues.

63. Over the quarter century of the operation of the Treaty, there had been both successes and failures in the nuclear non-proliferation policy. In spite of control by IAEA, nuclear-weapon States and the United Nations, a number of States had managed to come very close to creating nuclear weapons. Clearly,

participation in the Treaty was not a guarantee that States were not creating nuclear weapons. However, the general trend in international relations was towards a non-nuclear world, and with the implementation of the START I Treaty, nuclear disarmament had been intensified.

64. Kazakhstan favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. That would make it possible to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and continue efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Any formulations that left doubts about the future of the Treaty would undermine confidence in it and threaten the non-proliferation regime. The States which were fulfilling their commitments would be the first to suffer if the disarmament process were reversed. Kazakhstan was also in favour of the early completion of nuclear-test-ban negotiations. By closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear-testing grounds forever, Kazakhstan had made a significant contribution to that goal. It was obviously very important that four out of the five nuclear Powers were maintaining the moratorium on nuclear tests; however, the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be signed as soon as possible.

65. Non-nuclear-weapon States had a right to receive firm and legally binding security assurances, both negative and positive. Although Kazakhstan had welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), it fully supported the proposal that the security assurances should have the legally binding nature of an international instrument, which could be a protocol on security assurances forming an integral part of the Treaty. The memorandum on security assurances to Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine, signed by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States in December 1994, established a collective commitment to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan and safeguard it from economic blackmail. Kazakhstan had received similar assurances from China.

66. Negotiations must begin on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, and all States possessing such materials, especially the nuclear Powers, must be invited to take part. Kazakhstan also favoured an early start of nuclear-disarmament negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States in line with their commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation had become interdependent, and international security could be achieved only through joint efforts of both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

67. Kazakhstan respected the efforts of a number of States to establish regional security mechanisms to enhance the non-proliferation regime. It was actively working to implement President Nazarbaev's initiative to convene a conference on cooperation and confidence-building measures in Asia which could become an important factor in progress towards a nuclear-free world.

68. Kazakhstan appealed to all participants in the Conference to support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty as a guarantee of the effectiveness of the existing non-proliferation regime and of strengthening security and stability throughout the world.

69. Mr. Hasmy (Malaysia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

70. Monsignor MAMBERTI (Observer for the Holy See) said that, by acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Holy See had sought to manifest its support for the efforts of the international community to control the future of mankind, which was still threatened by the discovery of nuclear power and the military and civilian uses to which it had been put. History showed that mankind needed a sense of responsibility in order to live with what it had invented. Once let out, no human discovery can be "put back into the bottle" and it was therefore necessary for the international community to be aware of the risks which nuclear power presented and to establish rules of conduct applicable to all of its members.

71. It was well known that the objective of the Treaty was not merely to prevent nuclear proliferation but also to create a framework for nuclear disarmament and to facilitate access by all States to nuclear power, while preventing the risk of its improper use. The question to be asked, however, was whether the Treaty had been fully implemented and what kind of political commitment was required from each State party for its full implementation. Moreover, the principle of nuclear non-proliferation was not of itself sufficient to provide security. Non-proliferation should be part of a system of security under which the more powerful States of a region were required to commit themselves to dialogue with and respect for the weaker States by reconciling their national interests with the interests of the community of nations as a whole.

72. It was also evident that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by general and complete disarmament. Indeed, the Conference should manifest a clear political intention to achieve disarmament in order to create a favourable environment for the effective implementation of the Treaty. The aim of the Conference was not to redraft the Treaty or to include new provisions, but rather to create conditions for the more effective implementation of the Treaty by building confidence among all the parties thereto.

73. It would probably be dangerous to leave a legal vacuum on the question of non-proliferation, since that would open the door to nuclear conflicts and accidents. The Holy See was of the view that the Treaty should be maintained and strengthened. Indefinite extension, however, was not an end in itself and must be accompanied by a willingness by all concerned to ensure its implementation.

74. The Treaty was a major component of the structure of international instruments concerning weapons of mass destruction and should be seen as part of the international community's efforts to minimize the risk of a conflagration. The extension of the Treaty was justified by those objectives and could therefore be seen not as a mere ratification of the status quo but rather as a dynamic instrument in the service of peace. The risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons, as of other types of weapons, would probably never be eliminated and that was why international legal instruments governing them were so important. The history of mankind showed that peace and security, like justice, were never definitively won but had to be fought for continuously and with each new generation.

75. Nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction as well as by the limitation of conventional weapons. Nuclear-weapon States must therefore assume their special responsibilities in that regard while non-nuclear-weapon States must renew or enter into a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. States which did not acquire nuclear weapons must receive legal guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them and that they would be protected against their use. Moreover, any international agreement on global security required universal accession to the Treaty and the strengthening of its verification mechanisms and of disarmament measures. The Conference offered an opportunity to improve the current international situation and should not be turned into an adversarial debate on the extension of the Treaty.

76. In order to be effective, the Treaty must be complemented by a series of bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements on disarmament, the banning of nuclear tests, and the monitoring of progress in reducing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes must be carefully reviewed by the international community in order to guarantee more effectively the security of peoples and the preservation of all life. The risks inherent in the peaceful uses of atomic energy were now better known and the international community should therefore consider the need for international control and management of nuclear power. Since the peaceful uses of nuclear power also had applications in the fields of agriculture and medicine, nuclear power should be considered as a part of the common heritage of mankind.

77. The system of verification of the transfer of technologies must be improved, strengthened and expanded. In that connection, IAEA should seek to embody more effectively the international community's sense of responsibility in the nuclear field.

78. It was for those reasons that the Holy See appealed to the sense of responsibility of all concerned to support a new consensus on the principles and purposes of the Treaty.

79. Mr. CAMACHO OMISTE (Bolivia) noted that the Conference's historic responsibility vis-à-vis the Treaty coincided with the collective renewal of confidence in the purposes and principles of the Charter on the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. His delegation would do everything possible to contribute to the search for decisions which would win majority support and make it possible to achieve consensus. His Government's position would reflect its traditional peaceful policy. Bolivia believed that the basic objective of eliminating the nuclear threat was still valid and should be strengthened.

80. The parties to the Treaty must pursue negotiations taking into account the obligations of all countries, so as to avoid an imbalance among rights and duties; there was no question of ensuring advantages for some countries; instead, collective solutions must be found to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote global disarmament. A basic element of relations among States was the principle of fulfilment of international obligations in good faith. International stability and legality were assured through the fulfilment of obligations deriving from treaties and other sources of international law. The termination or suspension of a treaty was often the

result of a serious breach. International justice and the implementation of treaties were the basis for interchange among the peoples and peaceful coexistence.

81. Language was a significant aspect of treaties. His delegation would prefer not to use the term "unconditional" for commitments in which all aspects were equally important, since otherwise there could be an imbalance between rights and duties. A climate of trust would help to promote progress. States must avoid becoming entangled in positions which, while reflecting legitimate individual and sovereign concerns, made it difficult to achieve the higher common interest. Efforts must be resumed to achieve universality of the Treaty. No State could refuse to participate in solving issues of general interest which affected mankind. It was only with full support of the regime by all countries that the survival of the world could be ensured.

82. The subject of non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons must be approached in a balanced and comprehensive manner, along with other aspects linked to the Treaty. There must be a complete nuclear-test ban, a legal strengthening of the regime of security assurances, a strengthening of safeguards mechanisms and effective promotion of nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes so as to promote long-term economic and social development. The use of nuclear weapons or threat of their use would be a total negation of international law and civilized coexistence among nations. Bolivia therefore favoured the indefinite extension of the Treaty as a means of achieving the objectives embodied therein.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/SR.12
1 May 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 12th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 25 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. DHANAPALA	(Sri Lanka)
later:	Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Vice-President)	(Japan)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PALSSON (Iceland) said that although the end of the arms race had released new resources in the service of peace and solidarity of peoples, the international community had yet to break with the legacy of the cold war. Huge quantities of nuclear weapons still remained in the arsenals of rich countries and poor countries alike. There were tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and over a dozen States possessed ballistic missiles.

2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the key to efforts to remedy that situation. The Treaty was unlike any other arms control treaty; it was the only legally binding instrument of global application prohibiting the spread of nuclear arms. To throw its future into doubt would be to risk unravelling the non-proliferation regime and system of safeguards and would weaken the incentives for nuclear powers to undertake further disarmament measures. Iceland therefore believed that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and without conditions. Only thus would it be possible to prevent further proliferation and give substance to the commitment undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States, when signing the Treaty, to pursue negotiations in good faith relating to nuclear disarmament.

3. Extending the Treaty for an unlimited period would not be sufficient. It would also be necessary to adopt a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and an instrument prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation also required a continuous multilateral effort which must extend to the technology and materials necessary for the production of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In that connection, Iceland attached great importance to the objectives and guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

4. The lessons of the Chernobyl accident must also be borne in mind. Iceland welcomed the efforts being made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the safety of radioactive waste and the growing role it was playing in general in the area of nuclear safety and radiological protection. His delegation remained concerned, however, at the discharge into the sea of radioactive waste, which was then carried by ocean currents into the territorial waters of other States.

5. He concluded by pointing out that there was much more at stake than the technical and legal aspects of the review and extension of the Treaty. If the Conference was a failure, the international community would be condemned, like Sisyphus, to toil forever to roll the stone to the top of the hill, only to see it roll down again.

6. Mr. POPOV (Republic of Moldova) said that the Conference, which coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations was destined to play a major role, as evidenced by the breadth of its preparatory process and by the fact that its topics had occupied a central place in the discussions of the First Committee of the General Assembly during the latter's forty-ninth session and

during the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was one of the main factors likely to increase security fears, and it was imperative to put a stop to it. The Treaty, because of its many merits, would best serve the fundamental interests - economic as well as security - of all States. That was why the Republic of Moldova had acceded to that important instrument as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, it had undertaken not only to forego the use of nuclear weapons but also to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA.

7. He also pointed out that his country's new constitution contained provisions affirming its neutrality and prohibiting the presence, on its territory of foreign military forces, and bases that could be equipped with weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The Republic of Moldova considered that only indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty could effectively halt nuclear proliferation and assure the conditions necessary for progressive disarmament.

8. Reviewing other arguments in favour of indefinite extension, he said that, since there were now 178 States parties to the Treaty and all the continents were covered, the Treaty was almost universal in nature. He also welcomed the recent adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) and the individual statements made by the five nuclear Powers concerning security assurances. Those Powers had given both negative and positive security assurances, bringing the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely one step closer.

9. Continued reduction of arsenals leading eventually to the total elimination of atomic weapons and the conclusion, in the near future, of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and an instrument prohibiting the production of fissile material would also contribute greatly to the strengthening of a permanent, legally binding non-proliferation regime.

10. Pointing out that it would be very difficult to strengthen such a regime without effective and transparent monitoring and control, he said that the measures envisaged in the international system must also cover illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, a phenomenon that had acquired singular importance, particularly in the area corresponding to the territory of the former Soviet Union. In order to put an end to it, States must establish effective border inspections; those were currently lacking. The relevant international organizations could play a decisive role in that regard.

11. Mr. VALENCIA RODRIGUEZ (Ecuador) said that at the time the Treaty was negotiated, the world had been going through one of the most critical periods of the cold war. Since its aim was to achieve a balance of nuclear terror it had not aspired to perfection. And yet, it was in part thanks to the Treaty that the world had become a safer place. For example, there had been a considerable reduction in nuclear arsenals - although they were still too large - and appreciable progress had been made in the field of disarmament thanks, in particular, to the SALT I and SALT II Treaties and to the fact that the nuclear Powers had declared a moratorium on nuclear tests.

12. And yet much still remained to be done. It was imperative to move quickly to conclude a universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Progress made in that matter in the Conference on Disarmament inspired him to believe that that could be achieved in the relatively near future; in the meantime, the nuclear-weapon States should extend their moratorium on testing.

13. It was also necessary to conclude a treaty prohibiting the production, possession and marketing of fissile material; it should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable and effective. It was also necessary to put an end to illicit trafficking in radioactive material, the consequences of which could not be predicted.

14. With regard to the essential issue of positive and negative security assurances which the nuclear-weapon States could offer the non-nuclear-weapon States, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a positive step in the right direction; however, the security assurances it mentioned should be included in an instrument binding on all those States.

15. As some States, particularly those States with the capacity to develop nuclear energy for military purposes, had not yet acceded to the Treaty, efforts must be made to promote its universality. That was particularly important since the technical knowledge and means needed in order to produce nuclear weapons were becoming increasingly accessible.

16. It was fundamental to strengthen nuclear-weapon-free zones. In particular, the prompt entry into force of a denuclearized zone in Africa was indispensable.

17. In accordance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, true international cooperation should result in the non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

18. Although considerable progress had been made since the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA safeguards regime should be respected and strengthened. The Conference should address that issue.

19. Lastly, measures should be taken to protect and preserve the environment, especially from activities related to the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

20. More generally, his Government did not believe that the Treaty was an end in itself, nor that it should seek to perpetuate the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of States, but that its purpose was to promote and guarantee international peace and security through nuclear disarmament, as a fundamental step towards achieving general and complete disarmament. A climate of mutual trust and authentic international cooperation must be established. Accordingly, nuclear-weapon States should feel bound by a permanent commitment to pursue their nuclear disarmament, while non-nuclear-weapon States should not feel fearful for their security. It was also indispensable to continue the practice of convening five-year review conferences to verify fulfilment of the obligations deriving from the Treaty, particularly those under article VI.

21. In the light of all those factors, Ecuador favoured indefinite extension of the Treaty and hoped that the States parties would adopt a decision to that effect by consensus or by a broad majority.

22. Ms. KUROKOCHI (Japan), Vice-President, took the Chair.

23. Mr. SENILOLI (Fiji) said that while the Non-Proliferation Treaty had received broad support, it must become universal if the spread of nuclear weapons was to be prevented.

24. The task of creating a climate of confidence rested with the nuclear-weapon States since is was they that bore primary responsibility for disarmament and, in particular, for denuclearization. At a time when there was relative peace and a reduction in international tension, the pace of disarmament negotiations must be accelerated. Reduction or destruction of obsolete and excess nuclear-weapons capacity was not enough. There must be deeper and more meaningful cuts which demonstrated a clear commitment to substantial denuclearization. Voluntary and permanent cessation of all nuclear tests would be an important step in that direction. In that regard, while Fiji noted the progress being made towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it was deeply disturbed at reports that the current three-year moratorium on testing was likely to be discontinued by some States.

25. The provisions of the Treaty concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear technology were equally important. In that connection, articles IV and V must be fully and properly implemented. Those articles provided an incentive against the development and possession of nuclear technology that might be open to use for non-peaceful purposes.

26. Article VII of the Treaty deserved special attention, in that it provided for the possibility of concluding regional agreements on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Fiji was a party to the Rarotonga Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. The protocols to that Treaty required the nuclear-weapon States to give certain undertakings. The States parties were gratified that China and the Russian Federation had signed Protocols 2 and 3. However, they very much regretted that the remaining three nuclear Powers had not as yet signed any of the protocols, and they urged them to do so. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and contributed significantly to the security of the States that belonged to them. All those who supported and championed the cause of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should ensure that the treaties that had given rise to such zones were respected.

27. Turning to the object of the present Conference, the issue was not whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty had made the world a safer place and whether it should be extended and for how long, but whether all aspects of the Treaty had been faithfully implemented and, more particularly, whether the nuclear-weapon States had discharged their duties and obligations under the Treaty in a manner that enabled the non-nuclear-weapon States to feel confident about their fulfilment in the future.

28. With that in mind and given the tangible and concrete contribution that the Treaty had made to preventing the large-scale spread of nuclear weapons, Fiji supported indefinite extension of the Treaty and hoped that the Conference would reach an agreement to that effect by consensus.

29. Mr. OWADE (Kenya) said that his country had been among the first to sign, and subsequently, ratify, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had fulfilled its obligations as a State party faithfully. The Treaty was sui generis in several respects. Among other things, it had a limited lifespan and it created unequal rights and obligations for nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, it was the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, having the largest number of States parties of any arms control treaty. The expectation of the majority of States parties had been that it would lead to comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

30. Kenya believed that before taking a decision on the question of extending the Treaty, the Conference must take serious stock of the Treaty's successes, failures and weaknesses. To agitate for indefinite extension without first making that objective assessment would be putting the cart before the horse. Such a decision must, of course, be linked to an evaluation of the specific progress made towards the goals set forth in article VI of the Treaty.

31. Many delegations were concerned that while significant progress had been made in certain areas, none of the targets set in the preamble to the Treaty had been fully met. His delegation was particularly disappointed that the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament had produced little evidence of progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It had been argued that the progress in those talks could be characterized as a partial success or a partial failure, depending on which perspective one took. However, the truth was that a delay of a quarter of a century could hardly be considered the "early date" stipulated in the Treaty for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

32. Turning to security assurances, his delegation wished to recall that the General Assembly had consistently maintained that there was an urgent need to reach early agreement on effective international arrangements to safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The best approach would be to work towards early agreement on a common formula that could be included in a legally binding international instrument, as called for in General Assembly resolution 49/73. Disagreement over that issue had been one of the reasons for the failure of the 1980 and 1990 review conferences to adopt final declarations.

33. On the eve of the present Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had made a belated attempt to fulfil their obligations by initiating Security Council resolution 984 (1995), on positive security assurances, and by making individual declarations on negative assurances. Those initiatives were to be welcomed, but the fact remained that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) did not add much to previous resolutions and did not explicitly address the question of negative assurances. In Kenya's opinion, the only definite assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. Pending that, such assurances should take the form of a legally binding instrument.

34. For the Treaty to achieve full universality, it was imperative that States which possessed nuclear weapons should all be parties to it and be subject to the IAEA regime. States which had opted not to accede to the Treaty should not benefit from any transfer of technology for peaceful nuclear uses which, under the Treaty, was intended only for States parties.

35. With regard to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, his delegation would like the capacity of the IAEA to be strengthened to enable it to cope with its responsibilities, and in particular those relating to the transfer of technology. All States parties should have access, on an assured and predictable basis, to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The IAEA should be enabled to extend technical assistance without any constraints.

36. His delegation wished to put on record its commitment to regional initiatives. It awaited the conclusion of the treaty making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was currently being finalized. It also welcomed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and looked forward to an acceleration of the peace process in the Middle East that would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. It likewise welcomed the exemplary gesture made by South Africa in deciding to destroy its nuclear weapons and become a party to the Treaty. But in the African region, it was light weapons that were killing hundreds of thousands of people. His delegation therefore appealed to the international community to support the Secretary-General's efforts in what he had described as "micro-disarmament" in his supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60-S/1995/1).

37. The Conference must avoid the temptation to over-simplify the issues before it. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had not been intended to be a permanent treaty. Contrary to the view that had been expressed by several delegations, to fulfil the wishes of millions of human beings it was not enough to extend the Treaty indefinitely; it was necessary to ensure that its objectives were being achieved. In particular, the periodic review mechanism must be maintained and strengthened. Moreover, the question of extension was so important that any decision on it should be reached by consensus, so that the Treaty could move into the future with the full confidence of all States parties.

38. His delegation would work with other delegations with a view to reaching a consensus which could take the form of a long-term "rolled-over" Non-Proliferation Treaty on the lines originally intended. Any contrary decision would undermine the confidence which the international community so sorely needed as it faced the next century.

39. Mr. LEGWAILA (Botswana) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the only multilateral treaty in its field which enjoyed nearly universal adherence, and that was due to the extreme gravity of the nuclear threat. The motive for Botswana's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and no doubt that of other States parties, was the inhuman and indiscriminate mass destruction which could be visited upon mankind by the use of nuclear weapons.

40. As was clear from article IV of the Treaty, the renunciation of acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons and the technology to develop such weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States was not a renunciation of access to nuclear

technology for purposes other than military. In that connection, those States parties were not at all satisfied with the current level of nuclear technology transfers for peaceful uses. Without advocating the elimination of all conditions governing access to such technology they believed that, where a party had agreed to put in place a mechanism such as the IAEA safeguards, the benefits envisaged and recognized under article IV should accrue to such a party without prejudice.

41. The sterling efforts made by the non-nuclear-weapon States would not rid the world of the scourge of nuclear weapons without a corresponding commitment on the part of nuclear-weapon States to honour their part of the bargain. Major strides would have to be made in various areas of nuclear disarmament if the Treaty was to continue to engender confidence among non-nuclear-weapon States. Those States had made a significant contribution to the application of the Treaty. Not only had they chosen to forego acquisition of nuclear weapons but their almost religious adherence to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty had strengthened world security, and they had honoured their commitments without fail.

42. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, one of the major concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States had been to obtain security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. By renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States had foregone a sovereign right. They had foregone the right to self-defence. They had, in fact, renounced the possibility of responding in kind in the event of a nuclear attack. Their right to protection against those weapons must therefore be recognized.

43. Botswana appreciated that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a step in the right direction, but its preference would have been for a legally binding international instrument committing the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to work towards the adoption of such an instrument would remain a source of suspicion as to their real intentions.

44. To be genuinely engaged in a process of nuclear disarmament, certain key areas in the nuclear weapon industry had to be targeted. There should be a total ban on all forms of nuclear-weapon testing. The self-imposed moratoriums were a welcome development, but a final solution was not yet in sight. The best solution would be to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early date. His delegation noted that negotiations had begun in the Conference on Disarmament but the process was painfully slow, and one wondered if the nuclear-weapon States were really committed to their success. There was an equally urgent need to conclude a treaty banning the production of weapons-grade fissile material. Most of the previous speakers had alluded to the dangers posed by the continued production of such material. It not only added to the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons but it also encouraged the illegal trade in fissile material, even by individuals or dissident groups.

45. The most important step to be taken to enhance nuclear disarmament was the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The very existence of nuclear weapons made humankind captive to its own creation. Because of their devastating effects they should never be used. The Non-Proliferation Treaty

offered humankind a chance of freedom from that bondage. States parties need only honour the commitments and obligations they had undertaken and the threat would ultimately become a thing of the past. However, it was mainly the task of the nuclear-weapon States to earnestly engage in the process of nuclear disarmament. Botswana hoped that the concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States vis-à-vis the Treaty would be considered with due seriousness and that their genuine desire for protection against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be fully met.

46. His country was in favour of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The concerns it had expressed were a reaffirmation of the commitment of the parties to the Treaty and did not in any way constitute conditionalities.

The meeting rose at 11.35 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/SR.13
27 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 25 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PIBULSONGGRAM (Thailand) said it was gratifying that, in the course of the general debate, consensus had emerged on a number of points. Everyone recognized the historic importance of the Conference and agreed that the non-proliferation Treaty was the best available mechanism to help eliminate the nuclear threat, that it should be strengthened and made as effective as possible, and that for the foreseeable future, there was no alternative to extending it.

2. Thailand, which had no nuclear aspirations and saw no place for nuclear weaponry on the planet, had always viewed the Treaty as a means towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons. It therefore attached the highest importance to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States therefore had a special responsibility to ensure that the article was implemented and that the goals of full nuclear disarmament were achieved. Thailand believed that, while efforts by the major nuclear Powers to implement existing disarmament agreements could help strengthen article VI, the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would demonstrate their sincere commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. The effectiveness of the Treaty also called for a balance between the rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Articles I and II should therefore be regarded as a code of conduct. The principle of non-proliferation should be universally applicable and not limited to current States parties; all countries should therefore be encouraged to accede to the Treaty.

4. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system was a fundamental component of the Treaty which must be supported through the strengthening of article III. In particular, States parties which had not concluded and implemented comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA should do so as soon as possible. Supplementary measures to help prevent diversion of nuclear energy to military uses should also be promoted. The early conclusion of a non-discriminatory and verifiable convention banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for weapons purposes would be an additional contribution.

5. Thailand fully supported the right of States parties to exchange and acquire peaceful nuclear technology without discrimination, in the spirit of articles IV and V of the Treaty.

6. Treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones would be effective only when guaranteed by the nuclear-weapon States; the commitments of regional States alone would not ensure safety in the regions concerned. Thailand therefore considered the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga as essential for all such treaties.

7. On the question of security assurances from nuclear-weapon States, Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) fell short of making any legally binding commitment on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; without such a commitment, trust between non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States would remain elusive.

8. Thailand hoped that the decision on the future of the Treaty would be arrived at by consensus. It favoured extending the Treaty for fixed periods, as the best approach for achieving full nuclear disarmament. There had been far too much violence and destruction in the twentieth century; posterity must not be condemned to repeat the mistakes of history.

9. Mr. KULLA (Albania) said that, over the past 25 years, the international community had witnessed undeniable results in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and security assurances, which were all attributable to the non-proliferation Treaty. The high level of accession to the Treaty demonstrated the importance the world community attached to the Treaty and the success achieved in the efforts of sovereign States to implement its provisions.

10. Albania welcomed the efforts undertaken to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which must be universal and fully verifiable. A prompt opening of negotiations on a convention to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would further strengthen the non-proliferation system and promote disarmament. The security assurances in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were a collective response to a delicate matter. The nuclear-arms race had been ended through the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II treaties); strategic nuclear weapons must now be dismantled and deactivated. Albania acknowledged the efforts of IAEA to identify cases where safeguards agreements had not been complied with. Without the non-proliferation Treaty, international cooperation for verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and arrangements for safeguards on nuclear materials would be very difficult to achieve.

11. Albania fully supported the statement made on behalf of the European Union and six associated States from eastern and central Europe. His Government was fully convinced that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty would benefit all countries, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, and would be a victory for non-proliferation, disarmament, control and verification, thereby offering the prospect of a safe world. If the future of the Treaty was endangered, prospects for the further control of nuclear weapons would fade. If that future was secure, steps towards the reduction of the nuclear arsenal could continue with the final objective of full nuclear disarmament.

12. Mr. NGO QUANG XUAN (Viet Nam) said that the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty was unquestionable. Despite its flaws, the Treaty had been widely recognized as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and an important instrument for disarmament, world peace, and international and regional security and cooperation. The decision made by the Conference would be extremely important for the future of the Treaty and for the security, stability and development of every region and nation of the world. Viet Nam shared the

view that the review and extension of the Treaty were interlinked and that the issue of extension could not be dealt with in isolation.

13. It was encouraging that, despite the emergence of a number of "threshold" States, the Treaty had in the main succeeded in limiting the number of nuclear-weapon States. The treaties and commitments by the nuclear-weapon States were important achievements in the area of nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was also a positive aspect.

14. Viet Nam was concerned, however, that, while the number of nuclear-weapon States remained the same, there were more nuclear weapons in the world than when the Treaty had come into force and that, even if the nuclear-disarmament treaties were fully implemented, the remaining nuclear warheads would be more than enough to destroy civilization. Moreover, there was no legally binding mechanism to stop the further development of nuclear weapons and ensure security for non-nuclear-weapon States. A comprehensive test-ban treaty remained a hope rather than a reality. The unilateral security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States were not legally binding. Viet Nam also shared the concern of many delegations about the limited access of developing countries to nuclear technology because of export controls imposed by suppliers.

15. Viet Nam supported the steps advocated by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries to strengthen the Treaty.

16. In the aftermath of long, destructive wars, Viet Nam had acceded to a number of multilateral disarmament treaties, including the non-proliferation Treaty in 1982, and had always fulfilled its obligations as a State party to the Treaty. In 1990, it had signed a full safeguards agreement with IAEA with regard to its experimental reactor, followed up by numerous IAEA inspections with his Government's cooperation. A decree on radiation safety would soon be submitted for approval by the National Assembly. From the outset, Viet Nam had supported efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. In the field of nuclear energy for development, a number of small-scale projects had been carried out with the assistance of IAEA and regional countries. Viet Nam was studying the possibility of developing nuclear energy and hoped that when it took a decision in the matter, it would enjoy further cooperation of IAEA and countries in the spirit of article IV of the Treaty.

17. The Conference needed to find a modality for the extension of the Treaty which would serve the best interests of the Treaty and of international peace, security, stability and development. That task demanded a high sense of responsibility and a willingness to compromise on the part of every delegation.

18. Mr. KASHITA (Zambia) said that Zambia had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty because of its firm belief that it was the cornerstone of international peace and security. The Conference had a historic role to play; a sober assessment of the effectiveness of the Treaty should be followed by a reasoned decision as to the way in which the serious concerns would be addressed. It was an opportune time to strengthen the Treaty regime.

19. The issue was not whether to extend the Treaty or not; it was a question of safeguards, commitment and good faith. His Government had serious concerns

about the attitude of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of a number of issues, including that of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It was for that reason that Zambia could not associate itself with the unconditional aspect of the extension of the Treaty, because there was still much ground to be covered in the implementation of the Treaty itself. The world had lost out on the much-vaunted "peace dividend", and the international community needed to discuss how the lost ground was to be recovered.

20. His delegation was concerned that if the Treaty were to be unconditionally extended, its lack of effectiveness would be institutionalized, and there would be no incentive for the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith. The latter had so far been lacking, nuclear arsenals had undergone little effective reduction since 1970, and the nuclear-weapon States, apart from the United States and the Russian Federation, had not effected any meaningful reductions at all.

21. The use of the word "unconditional" in the context of the Conference was misleading. Either it was due to misunderstanding of the desire of the ordinary people of the world for the removal of nuclear weapons, or it had to be attributed to mischief-making; he knew of no country wishing to return to the period before the non-proliferation Treaty. Even those who had spoken in favour of indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty had expressed concerns and had advocated conditions or issues on which action should be taken to strengthen the Treaty. There was in fact no disagreement as to the destination; it was a matter of deciding at what speed to travel, to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty would be realized.

22. The issue of unconditional extension was an unnecessary diversion. There was every reason to predicate the indefinite extension of the Treaty on meaningful progress in a number of areas, some of which had been on the agenda since the Treaty had come into being. Paramount among them was the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to which his delegation attached the utmost importance; it was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and would be a milestone in the race to achieve complete disarmament.

23. There should also be a treaty banning the production of fissile material for explosive devices, and a treaty on negative security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, coupled with an agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons.

24. It was important to realize that the "conditions" or concerns being expressed by many States parties were intended to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty. Furthermore, Zambia believed that the Treaty would serve the international community better by the provision of adequate technical assistance to all non-nuclear-weapon States. It was regrettable that article IV of the Treaty had not been made a major area of responsibility of IAEA. If the vast amounts spent on nuclear-weapons research and development could be made available to a strengthened and independent IAEA, the whole world community would benefit immensely. The Treaty would also be greatly strengthened if the Agency could play a role in verifying the extent to which States were honouring the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

25. His delegation wished to compliment South Africa, whose bold decision to destroy its nuclear arsenal had made a major contribution to the cause of disarmament and to world peace. That example should be followed by other States.

26. In the post-cold-war era, there was no reason for continuing distrust. All nuclear Powers should move towards total commitment to a nuclear-weapons-free world in which future generations could live in peace and freedom from fear.

27. Mr. FERNANDEZ ESTIGARRIBIA (Paraguay) said that the Conference was exceptionally important for the future of humanity, and the fact that it was taking place in the same year as the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations was highly symbolic. The non-proliferation Treaty was as important to the preservation of international peace and security as the Charter of the United Nations itself.

28. Despite the numerous issues remaining to be settled, his delegation would support the indefinite extension of the Treaty, in the conviction that its beneficial effects were such that it should remain in force. A small, peace-loving country such as Paraguay considered the Treaty as an assurance of its own security and that of all humanity. His delegation's conviction of the need to eradicate nuclear weapons were all the stronger as a result of the terrorist attacks which had taken place recently in many parts of the world.

29. He welcomed the progress made during the lifetime of the Treaty, firstly to end the nuclear-arms race, and then to begin eliminating those arms. Although there remained much to be done to free humanity from the fear of nuclear war, the improvement already achieved was encouraging.

30. In the light of recent events, continued efforts should be made to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards system. Improved control of the production of nuclear material was due in part to that system, and also to the existence of a better political and security climate.

31. His Government was most gratified that a number of States had decided to renounce the development of nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty. He hoped that others would soon follow their example, and that nuclear energy, rather than an instrument of death, could contribute to a better life for all humanity. The duty to help those in need was universally recognized; developing countries such as Paraguay should be enabled to benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in agriculture, industry and medicine.

32. The great achievements of humanity were built upon small victories. The degree of non-proliferation achieved so far should be seen as a step towards the goal of total nuclear disarmament, and it was possible to look forward, in the near future, to a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material. It was also to be hoped that the principles contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) would soon be incorporated in a multilateral agreement.

33. His delegation hoped that the extremely important decisions to be taken by the Conference could be adopted by consensus, as befitted a Treaty which aspired

to universality, and would thus bequeath to future generations a world free from the fear of nuclear war.

34. Mr. SHAH (Nepal) commended those States parties which had dismantled their nuclear-weapons programmes; it was an act of courage and statesmanship of the highest order. The non-proliferation Treaty, signed amid an intensifying nuclear-arms race, had proved its relevance in stemming the rapid proliferation of nuclear arms. The post-cold-war climate currently offered unprecedented opportunities for a renewed commitment to international peace and security, and the Conference was one such opportunity.

35. He noted that there was growing optimism among the delegations attending the Conference, reflecting an overwhelming consensus in favour of strengthening the Treaty regime. The decision of the Conference would have a far-reaching influence on global peace, stability and development for decades to come. That peace and stability necessitated the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the Treaty was a means to that end.

36. A non-proliferation regime could be sustained only in the overall context of disarmament, nuclear or otherwise. The commitment under article VI to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament had remained largely unfulfilled; however, the situation had recently undergone a qualitative change.

37. A world free of nuclear weapons was Nepal's overriding concern; his Government believed that the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a verifiable treaty banning the production of weapons-grade fissile material were achievable. Negotiations should take place swiftly.

38. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged. Nepal would support all regional initiatives of that type, and they should be fully respected by the nuclear-weapon States. Security assurances should be credible and should in no way detract from the commitment of the permanent members of the Security Council. Negative assurances would go a long way in that regard.

39. Universality of the non-proliferation Treaty in both scope and application was the prime concern; any uncertainty about its life-span would weaken the Treaty regime.

40. The international community should not lose sight of the issue of conventional weaponry. In the interests of international peace and security, efforts should be made to minimize the diversion for armaments, both nuclear and conventional, of the world's resources; it would be better to channel the latter towards development activities in developing countries.

41. Mr. KAYUMOV (Tajikistan) said that, with the end of the cold war, new conflicts had erupted which could develop into large-scale wars and pose a threat to international peace and security. The crisis in and around Tajikistan was a grave danger for peace and stability in the region; the leaders of Tajikistan believed that the conflict did not have any military solution and were searching for political means of achieving national reconciliation. The

President of Tajikistan had called on the world community to continue to promote the progress and successful completion of the inter-Tajik talks that were under way.

42. The uncontrolled and unauthorized arms trade in areas of heightened instability gave rise to deep concern. Massive arming of whole regions was taking place. It was extremely difficult to confiscate illegal weapons from the population. On the basis of its own bitter experience, Tajikistan stressed the danger of that trend. The attempts of some countries to obtain nuclear weapons or the technology to produce them added a new dimension to the problem.

43. Tajikistan, which had the technology for the production and primary refining of uranium, firmly supported the non-proliferation Treaty. On attaining its independence, it had announced its firm commitment to the three principles of nuclear disarmament - not to develop, not to obtain and not to deploy weapons of mass destruction. The purpose of the Treaty was to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation and, eventually, the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty had worked well for the international community; the objective of making the Treaty universal had become real and achievable.

44. Tajikistan supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty as a key element of achieving a more stable and safe world. The effectiveness of the Treaty depended on the full implementation of both the spirit and letter of all its articles.

45. The treaties concluded between the Russian Federation and the United States and the measures taken by the United Kingdom and France for the reduction of nuclear weapons were encouraging. Tajikistan welcomed the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to continue talks on nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, as clearly indicated at the Conference by the Vice-President of the United States. His Government was gratified by the collective security assurances provided for the first time by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty; Security Council resolution 984 (1995) provided new incentives for universal accession to the Treaty and for its indefinite and unconditional extension.

46. The prevention of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation must continue to be the priorities of the international community in maintaining world peace and security. The future comprehensive test-ban treaty must be universal and must therefore encompass all States that had nuclear weapons, including such States as India, Israel and Pakistan.

47. Civil wars, armed tension along frontiers, power struggles, and the long-term absence of political settlement could lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; numerous armed groups, or simply armed bands of robbers, could well seek to acquire modern weapons. It was therefore more important than ever to make efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. All peace-loving States must support such efforts. The non-proliferation Treaty was of enormous significance in that respect; cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons would be an important means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

48. Through joint efforts, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, it would be possible to reduce the significance of nuclear weapons as an instrument of modern politics, in particular by strengthening political stability and reassessing the role of nuclear weapons in international politics; creating the political and security conditions for the renunciation of nuclear weapons; establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones; enhancing the IAEA safeguards; and adopting measures for the non-proliferation of military and dual-use nuclear technologies and the detection of secret nuclear-weapon programmes.

49. Ms. FLORES (Uruguay) reiterated Uruguay's consistent commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Her delegation called for the results of the Conference to be put in the form of a consensus document, as had been done at previous Treaty review conferences. Moreover, it was of the utmost importance that the Conference should obtain results that were satisfactory to those delegations expressing reservations about aspects of the Treaty.

50. Multilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States as well as the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had been important steps towards providing security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Nevertheless, her delegation continued to believe that such guarantees should be contained in a binding document in the context of a direct link between the Treaty and the continuing nuclear disarmament process. To ensure compliance with the Treaty, any agreement on extension reached at the Conference had to consider the establishment of a periodic review system.

51. With regard to the work of the main committees, her delegation called for careful consideration of the ways in which nuclear-weapon States cooperated with each other and with non-nuclear-weapon States, controls over the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, an analysis of export activities leading to the development of nuclear capabilities, a commitment to providing legally binding negative safeguards, and support for the establishment of denuclearized zones. Uruguay also called for strengthening IAEA operations and safeguard mechanisms, and reiterated its special concern regarding safeguards governing the transport of plutonium and other radioactive materials passing close to its coast.

52. Her delegation expressed interest in the proposal to establish a mechanism of an inter-sessional nature to facilitate agreements on specific issues, which in its view would strengthen the review process.

53. With regard to extension of the Treaty, her delegation was of the view that some of the proposals made at the Conference deserved to be carefully considered before definitive positions were adopted. Uruguay's support for indefinite extension of the Treaty was consistent with its traditional principles in the area of nuclear disarmament and its security concerns as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Any extension, however, had to be accompanied by a reliable system of periodic review.

54. Mr. LONGCHAMP (Haiti) said that, despite its importance as the legal foundation for nuclear non-proliferation as well as the basis for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, the Treaty had not fully accomplished its main objectives. It allowed nuclear-weapon States to keep their nuclear weapons

while preventing non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring them, and the provisions of the IAEA safeguards regime had not been even-handedly applied. It had not reduced the overall number of nuclear weapons in existence, and its provisions for the exchange of peaceful nuclear technology had not prevented States from acquiring the capability to assemble their own nuclear bombs. Nor had those provisions enabled many developing countries to resolve their lack of energy resources. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States had not respected their commitments under article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith, and the non-nuclear-weapon States still felt that the security assurances contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had to be strengthened by a binding international treaty.

55. Haiti unequivocally supported nuclear non-proliferation and total nuclear disarmament, and was aware of the progress in disarmament in recent years. The nuclear menace persisted, however, in the stockpiles of the nuclear Powers and perhaps of other States suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. A new danger had also arisen in the form of illicit trade in fissionable materials and in the risk of such materials falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists.

56. To be truly effective, the non-proliferation regime needed to be strengthened in order to correct its shortcomings. Nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should engage in the fundamental application of the Treaty, and those States which had yet to accede to it should do so as quickly as possible in order to ensure its universality. Above all, a treaty completely banning nuclear testing and a convention halting the production of fissile material should be concluded at the earliest possible date.

57. Mr. KAMUNANWIRE (Uganda) said that Uganda attached great importance to the non-proliferation Treaty and considered its extension to be a necessity. Such extension, however, should only be considered after the Conference had addressed the concerns raised about how the Treaty had operated during the 25 years of its existence. In the light of the changed international circumstances, in recent years the international community's perception of security, defence and the entire nuclear strategy should evolve accordingly.

58. The Conference was not about the extension of the Treaty as an ultimate goal; it was about the future of mankind and its vision of the twenty-first century. The ultimate aim was the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Emphasis must therefore be placed on charting a clear course towards that objective.

59. Uganda was of the view that a number of significant issues needed to be clarified. Extension of the Treaty should proceed only after a thorough review of the fulfilment of their obligations by States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty should also address the concerns of those who believed that it would confer the possession of deadly weapons upon certain States in perpetuity. Uganda believed that extension should be explicitly linked to progress in nuclear disarmament. Despite some progress in bilateral reductions in the context of the START I and START II treaties, there was need for a more concrete commitment to disarmament in a phased and predictable manner.

60. Recalling that the extension of the Treaty had been explicitly linked to progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, he called for the urgent conclusion of that treaty as a short-term goal. At the same time, non-nuclear-weapon States should be given legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In that regard, Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) did not provide adequate assurances.

61. There was also a need for assistance on a non-discriminatory basis to non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and its applications. The record in that area was uneven, since little assistance had been provided to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, while, paradoxically, a number of States not parties to the Treaty had been beneficiaries. Moreover, IAEA should take steps to strengthen the safeguard provisions of the Treaty.

62. Uganda fully shared Africa's aspiration to make the continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Efforts to that end must be actively supported by the nuclear-weapon States. Ultimately, the whole world should be free of nuclear weapons.

63. Unconditional extension of the Treaty was not among the options for extension provided for in article X. It was thus clear that the drafters had recognized the need for progress in implementation as a key determinant of whether or not to extend the Treaty. Indeed, no effort should be spared to strive towards a strengthened, balanced and widely supported non-proliferation regime which could ultimately enjoy universal membership. Those objectives could be best achieved through the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

64. Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) said that Panama had been an early signatory to the non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it had long advocated that Latin America and the Caribbean should be converted into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. That aspiration had become reality with the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. His delegation was convinced of the international community's desire for a better world and hoped, therefore, that wisdom and moderation would prevail during the current Conference.

65. The mission of maintaining international peace and security had been a very challenging one for the United Nations, particularly in view of the existence of weapons of mass destruction which could lead to the extinction of human life on Earth. The recent improvement, however, in the international situation gave rise to the hope that, individually and collectively, mankind had learned that well-being, peace, security and justice could not be achieved through an arms race, whether nuclear or conventional. Because of the experiences of the past, the Conference should guard against any attitudes that could jeopardize certain difficult but necessary balances. His delegation therefore hoped that the difficult debate ahead would be characterized by generosity, an intelligent acknowledgement of current realities and an awareness of the role which the Treaty was called upon to play.

66. At the time of its entry into force, a small number of countries had possessed nuclear weapons while the majority had not. That imbalance should

have been corrected using the mechanisms provided for in the Treaty. Some of those mechanisms were about to be put in place and others had functioned but with evident shortcomings.

67. The safeguards system established under article III appeared to be undermined by the difficulties encountered by IAEA in performing its tasks. IAEA should therefore be strengthened in order to enable it to fulfil its verification responsibilities. With regard to article IV, no consistent effort had been made to apply in the developing countries, such as Panama, the fruits of science and technology in the field of nuclear energy. That failure was very evident in the health, industrial and agricultural sectors.

68. It should be recalled that during the 1990 Review Conference, the majority of States parties had renewed their calls for guarantees. His delegation therefore welcomed resolution 984 (1995) recently adopted by the Security Council. That resolution should, however, be accompanied by a recognition of the need for a non-proliferation regime that was equitable, and for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States.

69. The Treaty as a whole, in the light of article VI, should be taken in conjunction with its preamble, which was linked to the adoption of measures aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, such as, inter alia, the elimination of fissionable material, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions and the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems from national arsenals.

70. Because of its geographical location and of the Canal which linked the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Panama had displayed a universalist vocation throughout the various stages of its history. It therefore hoped that the last few years of the century would witness a redressing of the imbalances in the world and progress towards greater solidarity among nations. In order to preserve civilization, it was necessary to halt the production of nuclear weapons, put an end to nuclear tests and ensure that the Treaty achieved universality in terms of both participation and compliance. The position of Panama was that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and, since it went hand in hand with nuclear deterrence, that all parties should give firm and transparent commitments to periodic reviews of its provisions.

71. Mr. BUALLAY (Bahrain) said that the Conference was being held at a time when the international situation was different from that which prevailed during the preparation of the Treaty. The number of nuclear-weapon States had increased and nuclear weapons in the hands of certain States posed an intolerable threat to non-nuclear-weapon States, which lived in constant fear. Because of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, there was need to review the Treaty in all its aspects in order to evaluate both the positive and negative effects of its application. A review should also be undertaken with a view to the establishment of regional military balances, which was another objective of the Treaty.

72. The Arab countries continued to support the Treaty and, at the previous meeting of the Council of the League of Arab States, had reaffirmed their

support for its goals and had called for the Middle East region to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone, free of all weapons of mass destruction. However, the continued refusal by Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system created an exceptional situation which could threaten regional peace and security. Bahrain therefore called upon all countries in the region, including Israel, to accede to the Treaty and to place all their nuclear facilities under the international safeguards system in order to avoid the horrors of a nuclear-arms race.

73. Bahrain and its sister States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council wished to see the Gulf region remain free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order to establish peace and security in the region and to concentrate on raising the living standards of the peoples and at providing prosperity for future generations.

74. The Conference afforded an opportunity to improve the Treaty by creating the necessary legal framework to bridge the gaps in the Treaty so that it could more effectively respond to new international realities. That framework should include, but not be limited to, the provision of effective guarantees for the protection of non-nuclear-weapon States faced with the use or threat of nuclear weapons. It should also provide for the transfer of nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes and for assurances by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon. Bahrain believed that such a framework, together with the achievement of the universality of the Treaty, would provide an appropriate climate for its indefinite extension.

75. The PRESIDENT announced that the general debate had been concluded, but that he would continue to hold consultations with a view to reaching a consensus on rule 28, paragraph 3 (f), of the draft rules of procedure.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/SR.14
9 May 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 5 May 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

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Any corrections to the records of this meeting and of other meetings of the Conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the Conference.

95-80982 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

REPORTS OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES

1. The PRESIDENT said that he would suspend the meeting in order to allow Main Committee II to adopt its report.

The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.40 p.m.

2. The PRESIDENT said that Main Committee I would need to hold an additional meeting in order to adopt its report and would submit its final report on Monday, 8 May 1995. He took it that the Conference agreed with that request.

3. It was so decided.

4. The PRESIDENT invited the Chairman of Main Committee II to introduce his report.

5. Mr. ERDŐS (Hungary) said that Main Committee II had completed its work on all the relevant issues that had been entrusted to it by the Conference except for export controls; the latter would be further discussed in a drafting group, which would report its results directly to the Drafting Committee.

6. The Committee had reached agreement on the agenda items concerning the review of article III and its relation to articles I, II, IV and VII of the Treaty, with the exception of a few sentences that remained in brackets in the report. On the issue of safeguards, the Committee had reached a consensus on the text and language except for the paragraphs relating to Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had been referred to the Drafting Committee for finalization.

7. The Committee had agreed that safeguards were an important part of the international non-proliferation regime and that they played an indispensable role in ensuring the implementation of the Treaty. It had also agreed on the importance of both the safeguards system and the legitimate right of States parties, especially the developing countries, to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Committee had welcomed the continued efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards and called upon all States parties to the Treaty to continue their political, technical and financial support for the IAEA safeguards system. The Committee had also called for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States and underscored the importance of State and regional systems of accounting and control and their contribution to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. It had noted the need for greater transparency in matters relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for civil purposes and had stressed the importance of the effective physical protection of nuclear material, especially nuclear material usable for military purposes. The

Committee had also expressed concern at instances of illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

8. The Committee had reached agreement on the texts submitted on nuclear-weapon-free zones, except for those calling for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East and Central Europe. It had also expressed its support for the need for nuclear-weapon-free zones and agreed that such zones contributed to the enhancement of regional peace and security and strengthened further the barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

9. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee II.

10. It was so decided.

11. The PRESIDENT invited the Chairman of Main Committee III to present his report.

12. Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands) said that an advance copy of the report had been made available to delegations as document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1. The Committee had worked intensively to arrive at generally acceptable formulations for the Final Declaration on article IV regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, article V on peaceful nuclear explosions, and article IX concerning wider adherence to the Convention.

13. Because of the spirit of good will that had prevailed in the Committee's deliberations, all the paragraphs save one in the substantive part of the document had been agreed. The language of the formulations was significant in that it indicated the considerable amount of cooperation that actually existed in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He wished to commend the ideas contained in the agreed part of the text to the Conference for inclusion in the Final Declaration.

14. The paragraph left in brackets expressed concerns over full access to nuclear technology, a question which was of keen interest to the Conference. It was the understanding of Main Committee III that the paragraph would be taken up for consideration by the Drafting Committee.

15. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee III.

16. It was so decided.

OTHER MATTERS

17. The PRESIDENT invited the Chairman of the Credentials Committee to present his interim report.

18. Mr. GARCIA (Colombia) said that delegations would find the report in document NPT/CONF.1995/CC/L.1. The Credentials Committee established by the Conference had met twice to examine the credentials of representatives

participating in the Conference. The interim report contained information on the status of credentials received as of 27 April. Additional credentials had been received since that date, and the Committee had held a third meeting on 4 May.

19. Based on information received from the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Committee had decided to accept the credentials of 168 States participating in the Conference, on the understanding that those delegations which had not presented their credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure would do so as soon as possible. The Credentials Committee intended to keep the situation under review.

20. The PRESIDENT, reporting on his consultations on one outstanding aspect of rule 28.3 (f), said that a consensus seemed to be emerging that would allow the Conference to adopt the rules of procedure formally, but that further discussion was still required.

21. Mr. WESTDAL (Canada), on behalf of the 103 sponsors, namely, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of Palau, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uzbekistan, introduced the following draft decision: "The Conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in accordance with article X.2 of the Treaty, decides that the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely".

22. Mr. TARNIDZI (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of some members of the Non-Aligned Movement and supported by a number of other countries, suggested that the decision on extending the Treaty should reflect both the spirit and the letter of article X, paragraph 2, of that Treaty and should be characterized by consensus, recognition of the legitimate concerns and interests of all States parties, compatibility with the Treaty's stated objectives, the implementation of a review procedure, and the establishment of a decision-making mechanism on the Treaty's roll-over extension from one period to another.

23. The option of an indefinite extension of the Treaty did not meet those requirements since it would basically perpetuate the status quo, and in addition it was flawed by the lack of a strong and effective review procedure and an appropriate decision-making mechanism.

24. The aforementioned requirements would be met by extending the Treaty for rolling fixed periods of 25 years; the Treaty would be automatically renewable unless a majority of the States parties decided otherwise, and it would be supplemented by a strong and effective review mechanism. Furthermore, 25 years was also long enough to facilitate the planning and implementation of the transfer of technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy as envisaged by article IV of the Treaty.

25. Mr. BAEL (Philippines) said that his delegation wished to join the sponsors of the draft decision introduced by Canada. It did so in order to make a point, namely that there should be no bargaining in nuclear non-proliferation or nuclear disarmament. That common vision could only be achieved through negotiations in good faith as mandated by article VI of the Treaty. The review process, even if strengthened with principles, did not constitute negotiations in good faith. The distinction between negotiations in good faith and review every five years was made absolutely explicit in the Treaty. The review process had never resulted in binding commitments; it had merely led to wrangling over whose interpretation of compliance should be included in the resulting declaration.

26. In the light of the new geopolitical situation following the end of the cold war, States parties should fulfil their obligations under article VI and embark on negotiations in good faith. The best way to achieve that goal would be to convene an international conference that would eventually prescribe binding commitments.

27. Mr. GONZALEZ GALVEZ (Mexico) said that while his delegation found the arguments in favour of indefinite extension convincing, there were a number of other matters that needed to be dealt with first; they could only be addressed through an adequate review mechanism. Accordingly, the Conference should adopt a compromise formula which his delegation would submit in due course.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.